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Contemplation of the world's disappearing supplies of minerals, forests, and other 
exhaustible assets has led to demands for regulation of their exploitation. The 
feeling that these products are now too cheap for the good of future generations, 
that they are being selfishly exploited at too rapid a rate, and that in consequence of 
their excessive cheapness they are being produced and consumed wastefully has 
given rise to the conservation movement'. 
The problems that gave rise to Hotelling's seminal work do not appear to have left us, and 
although he furnished us with some valuable results and tools to use in the analysis of these 
problems, there is still much to be done to expand our understanding as economists of the factors 
that influence extraction and the understanding of conservationists as to what optimal extraction is. 
While this paper is not primarily concerned with broadening this understanding, it has of necessity 
brought together much of the work that underpins this area of study, and may thus be of some use 
to this end. 
This paper's is to analyse and discuss the proposed ANC minerals policy, with particular reference 
to taxation. This is the subject of chapter four of this paper. Chapters two and three will lay the 
foundation upon which the analysis and discussion will be based, specifically, chapter two will 
review the theory of resource extraction, exploration and taxation, and describe a few of the 
important results in this field of study, while chapter three will describe some real world 
experiences with mineral tax systems. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will introduce the issues that this paper will be 
addressing, beginning with the problem of optimal extraction. Additionally, some of the terms, 
such as 'rent' and 'sustainable development', which will be used extensively through the rest of the 
paper will be defined, explained and described. 
1.1 Optimal Extraction 
To define optimal extraction objectively is a difficult task, even, perhaps, an impossible one. The 
idea of optimality is a social one, which may change as society's values and desires change. Thus 
what may be seen as optimal by some may seem undesirable to others, everybody has a different 
idea of what is best for themselves and everybody else. The idea of optimality is to maximise, the 
1 Hotelling, 1931 p137 
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problem is that there are a large number of variables that it may be desirable to maximise, and the 
choice of which of these to use in the maximisation process is purely subjective. 
In the case of extraction of exhaustible resources, the idea is to find an extraction path or pattern 
that leads to the maximisation of some measure of welfare, either for the individual or for the 
community at large and future generations. It is obviously impossible to judge objectively the 
choice of variable or variables to be maximised, all that can be judged is whether the objectives are 
being achieved, and whether such achievements justify the incurred costs, however these are 
measured. 
In order to make this sort ofjudgement, the economics profession has derived some benchmarks 
against which the effects of pursuing various policies may be measured. The one usually used in 
this field is the extraction path under the assumptions of profit maximisation and a full set of 
perfectly competitive spot and futures markets (i.e. there is no uncertainty). The effects of all 
policies or market inadequacies on the extraction profile are judged against this benchmark. This is 
the benchmark used in this paper, and it is presented at the beginning of the next chapter. 
1.2 Rents 
The concept of economic rent is attributable to David Ricardo, who considered the case of 
agricultural land. The concept as expressed by Ricardo is based upon the existence of varying 
grades of soil fertility. Thus highly fertile soil which affords its owner the ability to produce more 
cheaply than others while facing the same price for his output, generates a return in excess of the 
owner's opportunity cost. This is the case for 'differential rents', where the rent accrues due to 
differential quality or fertility. Rent arises because of the limit on the better sources of supply, 
because of differences in output quantities produced by equal quantities of factor inputs. The other 
type of rent recognised by Ricardo was 'scarcity rent', this being due to the limitation of supply. 
"Rent is then the difference between the product of all capital-and-Iabour and the product of the 
final dose [of inputs] at the intensive margin." [Blaug '85 p.82]. 
Rent fonns no part of the expense of production: that is, it fonns no part of those 
expenses of production which affect price. It is a differential gain, an excess over and 
above the total expenses of the more fortunate producers. Price is determined by the 
cost of the marginal increment. Rent is not one of the factors bearing on price, but is 
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the result of price. It is due to the comparatively high price which must be paid to 
bring out the total supply. 2 
It was proposed by Henry George that the economic rent on land is a return over and above that 
which is necessary to induce investment, and as such should be taxed away. It was suggested that 
this so called • single tax' would, by taxing away the full amount of economic rent on land, generate 
sufficient revenue to allow all other levies to be dispensed with. 3 The Marshallian objection to such 
a tax is that not only land, but all economic factors may earns rents in the short run, and that even 
'differential rents' are a form of incentive, encouraging the economical use of more fertile and thus 
scarcer land. Also, at a practical level, there is the problem of measuring the investment made in 
the soil and the normal return on it. 
In the case of mines, economic rent was initially considered to be similar in nature to that 
of agricultural land, with rents accruing to individual mines because of differences in 
situation and relative richness of ore, i.e. differences in ore grade. This was the way in 
which Gray (1914) analysed the problem of rents and the exhaustion ofrnineral resources. 
The way it is considered today is somewhat different. The rent is not associated with 
differential ore grades, but is rather described more simply as the difference between 
selling price and cost of production including opportunity cost. Following HoteUing 
( 1931), a mineral resource is considered as part of a portfolio of assets. Such an asset 
must generate a return, and by the nature ofa resource stock in the ground, the only source 
of such a return is capital gains. A resource owner is indifferent between receiving price p 
(net of cost) today and price pe-Ot at time t in the future, where (5 is the market rate of 
interest. Obviously p (price net ofcost) is the modem definition of rent, and the result that 
Hotelling arrived at was that the resource owner would choose his extraction profile in 
such a way as to cause the rent to rise at the rate of interest. Rent in this instance is 
influenced by extraction rates rather than grade differences. Another interpretation is that 
rent is that amount required to compensate the resource owner for the opportunity cost of 
not still having the ore that has been extracted available in the ground for future extraction. 
This is what Keynes referred to as 'user cost' in his General Theory of Employrnent, 
2 Taussig 1920 p.56 (Emphasis added) 
3 Substantially similar results would be attained by the community taking possession of the land for all 
time and letting it to tenants for the amount of its rent, allowing the latter to keep enough to pay for all 
improvements and interest on them, but requiring payment of the excess. Taussig (1920) This is important 
as it is essentially what the ANC proposes should be done with land used for mining. The point will be 
discussed more fully in chapter 4. 
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Interest, and Money. Although Keynes was more concerned with the case of capital in 
general, he did use the example of a copper mine to illustrate his point. 
In the case of raw materials the necessity of allowing for user cost is obvious; if a 
ton of copper is used up today it cannot be used to-morrow, and the value which 
the copper would have for the purposes of to-morrow must clearly be reckoned as 
part of the marginal cost. 4 
In general, when an owner of a mineral resource stock leases out the resource to be mined, an 
amount per ton extracted is paid to the owner to compensate him for the loss of future availability 
of the extracted ore. This amount has historically been called a royalty, and is a rough-and-ready 
means of extracting the economic rent. Over time the term royalty has come to be used 
synonymously with economic rent. There are thus three terms used in the literature which all refer 
to essentially the same thing, these are: 
1) Royalty: 
2) Economic rent; and 
3) User cost. 
Of these three, by far the most widely used is rent, and it is this which shall be used throughout this 
paper. 
It is the interpretation of rent as compensation for the opportunity cost of not keeping the stock in 
the ground for future use that brings us to the question of taxation and also the subject of the 
sustainability of economic development and intergenerational equity. 
1.3 Taxation 
If the rent generated by extracting a resource is compensation for not having it there in the future, it 
begs the question, who should be compensated? i.e. who should benefit from the rents? It is 
generally felt that the community and future generations should be the ones to benefit from the 
rents accruing from the reduction in a resource stock, just as it is widely felt that the mineral wealth 
of a nation belongs to all the people of that nation, and in fact in most countries (South Africa is an 
exception) all mineral rights are held by the state on behalf of the citizens of the nation. 
The state thus takes on the responsibility of extracting the economic rent by way of lease 
agreements and various taxes in order to use the rents to the benefit of the community at large. It is 
the effect of these taxes on the behaviour of those who mine the resource which is of primary 
4 Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money p. 73 
4 
interests to this paper. The State's obligation to use the extracted rents to the benefit of the 
community and future generations brings us to the matter of sustainable development (which, it 
will be sho\\<11 as an aside, casts a shadow of doubt on the justification of the state in taking on this 
role). 
1.4 Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development has become something of a catchphrase in the 90's, although there is 
seldom any attempt to define specifically what is meant by it. The UN Commission on Economic 
Development (UNCED) defined sustainable development in its 1987 Our Common Future as that 
which "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their 0\\<11 needs." This does nothing to guide economic and environmental policy. Taylor 
(1994) 
It must be noted that sustainable development need not imply economic growth! It may be used to 
indicate a simple change in patterns of economic activity (without growth) in order to enhance 
human development. Some authors [Daly 1990] even say that there cannot be such a thing as 
sustainable growth. The writers of Our Common Future, however, saw things differently and 
maintained that economic growth was a prerequisite of sustainable development. There is thus 
some rejection of the advocates for zero or even negative growth (this approach has become a 
minority position) such as Robert Heilbroner, Paul Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin, Barry Commoner, and 
Dennis and Donella Matthews. Taylor (1994) 
The idea of sustainable development is interwoven with that of equity, both intergenerational and 
within generations. This raises questions about economic growth and income redistribution. It is 
here that the State is seen as having a role to play. It is argued that the state is in the best position 
to ensure that the principles of sustainable development are adhered to, by taxing the rents from 
mineral extraction and using the proceeds to ensure development for present generations and equity 
between generations. Hartwick's (1977) suggestion that in order to ensure sustainable development 
and intergenerational equity, the economic rents from exhaustible resources should be invested in 
reproducible capital such as machines or human capital (or exploration and research into 
substitutes) rather than be consumed, may be seen to raise some doubts about this argument. This 
is because the belief that the State can be relied on to provide for "intergenerational compensation" 
is open to the same public-choice criticisms as all State undertakings5, and there is no evidence 
5 This point may be challenged by those who believe the state has a role to play due to the divergence 
between social and private discount rates. In South Africa, where the market interest rate is detennined 
more by Reserve Bank policy than by the markets, this may be particularly true. If this market rate is "too 
5 
that the market does not make the necessary investment, even if most of the profits from mining are 
paid out in dividends rather than re·invested6. This point will be discussed further in the conclusion, 
i.e. in chapter five. 
Of course there is implicit in the calls for sustainable development the assumption that present 
development patterns are unsustainable. This assumption may be challenged however, and is done 
so quite convincingly by Taylor (1994). It is Taylor'S contention that there is little evidence to 
indicate that present growth and development patterns are unsustainable, and that in fact as 
economic growth takes place, the World's development becomes more sustainable in that future 
generation will inherit more natural and man made capital than any preceding generation, while 
present generations are similarly facing improving conditions, as indicated by higher per capita 
incomes and lower mortality rates. In fact, the major cause of unsustainable practices is 
government interference in factor and product markets. Government subsidies that undermine the 
price mechanism being perhaps the greatest threat to sustainability. An example of this 
undermining of resource prices is the subsidies on energy consumption, which in developing 
countries total $230 billion annually, four times the volume of developmental assistance. Taylor 
(1994). Again, this matter will be discussed further in chapter four of this paper. 
1.5 Outline of the paper 
From here, the paper will develop as follows:· 
Chapter two consists of a review of the literature on the problem ofoptimal extraction and to some 
extent exploration, and the effects of uncertainty and taxation thereupon. The chapter begins with a 
section on the basic results that followed from HoteUing's (1931) work. This is followed by a 
section on the effects of taxation on extraction and exploration. 
Chapter three is a descriptive one, with the tax systems of South Africa past (and present), as well 
as a description of the effects of these systems on the mining industry. 
As mentioned before, chapter four will consist of a description of proposed ANC minerals policy, 
followed by an analysis thereof based on the findings of the previous two chapters. 
high", then future consumption will be discounted "too much" and there will not be enough investment 
from a social welfare point of view. However, as noted in appendix A, this may result in conselVation of 
the resource and reduce the need for any intergenerational compensation. There is thus no definite social 
harm done by such a divergence, and the challenge is weakened. 
6 It may be in the best interests ofa nation to have the State take on this role to ensure that the rents are 
invested in such a manner as to compensate future generations of that nation, particularly ifa large 
proportion of the rents are channelled to overseas investors via dividend payments. 
6 
Chapter five will be the conclusion ofthe paper, with a brief summary offindings and policy 
suggestions. 
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2. Theory and literature survey chapter 
The intention of this chapter is to give a survey of the results obtained in this field of study. It will 
begin with a description of what may be considered the ideal extraction profile obtained by 
maximising the social utility of extraction over time, followed by an indication of how this 
compares to the case of perfect competition. This is essentially a recap. of Hot elling's proof that 
the perfect competition results are socially optimal under certain circumstances. This will be our 
benchmark for evaluating the effects of market imperfections and taxation schemes on extraction 
profiles. 
This description of a benchmark will be followed by a section dealing with market imperfections 
such as market concentration, externalities and uncertainty and the effects these have on extraction 
profiles. The chapter will end with a section describing the effects of various taxation schemes on 
the mining industry and extraction and their use in addressing the problems of market imperfections 
in this sector. 
Throughout this section, the use of control theory techniques will be used. In most of the examples 
given, only the results of the problem will be presented. Interested readers may find full solutions to 
the problems in many of the references given in the bibliography, however, Conrad and Clark 
(1987) in particular is suggested for an overview of the technique and solution of control 
problems. 
2.1 	 Utopia 

(The benchmark of perfect competition in perfect markets, 

i.e. no uncertainty, government or externalities.) 
This section seeks to give an indication ofwhat may be considered a socially optimal depletion 
pattern. It will do so using a very simple model, based on the maximisation of social utility as 
measured by the area under the inverse demand curve. There are obviously other measures of 
social welfare, however the utility measure is as good as any for our purposes and is widely 
accepted. 
The following draws from Conrad and Clark (1987) 
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Assume that a sociaUy minded planner wants to deplete a resource in the sociaUy optimum way, 
i.e. in our example he wishes to maximise social utility from production q(t), given by the area 
under the inverse demand curve less the area under the marginal cost curve. To keep the example 
simple, assume that the cost of extracting ore depends only on the rate of extraction q(t). The 
Variables are thus, 
R == total amount of resource available 
q(t) == rate of extraction 
C(t) == C(q(t» =cost ofextraction 
U(t) == U(q(t» =utility of extraction 
P(q(t» = inverse demand curve 
t = time 
T = time of final depletion. 
(5 = the constant rate of interest 
The planner aims to 
maximise r [U(q(t» - C(q(t»] e -8t dt 
subject to R = --<let) 
with R(O) given and R(t) ;:; 0 
The current value Hamiltonian is 
H = U(q(t»- C(q(t» -).( (t)q(t) 
with first order conditions 
or~(t)=O 

~).(t) = -q(t) 

orbR(t) = 8).(t) - f..i= 0 
which can be solved to obtain 
D' (q(t» - C' (q(t» - JJ (t) = 0 
f..i = 8JJ (t) 
Ifwe note that U(q(t» =P(q(t» = pet), then, it can be shown that 
9 
~t (P(t) - C' (q(t)%) _ C' (q(t» = 8 
which in turn implies that price net of marginal cost, or in other words the rent or royalty, rises at 

the rate of interest. 

(This assumes that C(q(t» is convex, thus implying that the first order conditions are also 

sufficient. That is we assume C(q(t» > °and C" > 0, i.e. costs rising at an increasing rate.) 

If we had assumed constant costs of extraction, the result above would collapse to much simpler 

equation easily identifiable as the well-known Hotelling's Rule, 

%~J(l- fp) 
This path for price net of marginal cost, or rent, dictates the depletion path for the resource. At a 

superficial level, it is possible to say that given a downward sloping demand curve, to achieve 

increasing prices the quantity produced must fall through time. 

The case for a competitive market is very similar, and as will be seen, leads to the identical result. 





The actual function to be maximised is the following, asswning the maximisation of profits as the 

objective of the competitive finn, 

Max n = fT [p(t)q(t) - C(q(t»] e ·51 dt 
o 
subject to R = -q(t) 
with R(O) given and R(t) ~ 0 
The solution to this is identical to the case for the social planner above, with the results coming 
directly from the first order conditions. The fact that the path for price net of marginal cost is the 
same in both cases, implies an identical extraction path. 
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2.2 The real world 
In the real world of course there are a number of reasons why the market and socially optimal 
depletion paths may not be realised or even coincide. The reasons for the non--equality of the 
market and socially optimal paths are the existence of imperfect competition in resource markets, 
uncertainty, government intervention and externalities. The first two of these shall be discussed in 
this section, together with a brief mention of some interventionist government policy. Externalities 
shall not be discussed, except to note that they will affect the rate of extraction in so far as they 
cause the private marginal cost of extraction to deviate from the social marginal cost. Negative 
externalities would thus make extraction faster than optimal, while positive externalities would 
imply a slower than optimal extraction rate. 
The reason the market and optimal paths may not coincide, given full certainty and no government 
intervention, is that the interest rate used for private investment decisions, i.e. the private interest 
rate, may not coincide with the social discount rate. This is a complex issue, with no agreement as 
to whether the private rate is in fact higher or lower than the social rate, and conflicting direct and 
indirect effects of the private rate differing from the social rate. The direct effect of the interest rate 
is to affect the path of the resource price, and thus the extraction rate, while the indirect effect is on 
the price of capital required to finance the mining operation. Given the uncertainty surrounding this 
issue, this paper will assume the private and social interest rates equal. 7 
2.2.1 Imperfect competition 
Monopoly 
The effects of a monopoly on resource extraction have been studied in detail, beginning with 
Hotelling's seminal article. The monopolist essentially faces the same maximisation problem as the 
competitive firm, the difference being that the monopolist is able to influence the price of his 
product by changing his level of output. His problem can thus be stated (using the same notation as 
above) as 
T 




subject to R =-q(t) 
7 For a more detailed discussion of this point, refer to appendix A. 
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with R(O) given and R(t) ~ 0 
this can be solved as usual, and we find that the solution gives the result that marginal revenue net 
of marginal cost must rise at a percentage rate equal to the rate of interest. This is a similar, 
although slightly altered, result to those obtained above. We cannot say what the effect of this 
slightly altered result is on the rate of depletion, unless we know more about the nature of the 
demand for the resource. 
The elasticity of demand can determine whether a monopolist depletes a resource more or less 
rapidly than his social welfare maximising or competitive counterpart. If the elasticity of demand8 
increases as we move down the demand curve, then the monopolist will initially deplete the 
resource at a slower rate than is optimal. (It is this case which gives rise to the adage that the 
monopolist is the conservationist's friend.) If on the other hand the elasticity of demand decreases 
down the demand curve, the monopolist may in fact deplete the resource faster than is optimal. 
This situation may not be sustainable, as it implies that the rents from the resource are growing 
faster than the interest rate, this would raise the speculative demand for the resource, with such 
speculation limited only by the availability of finance. This speculation would significantly alter the 
demand curve. Oasgupta and Heal (1979) investigate the possibility of a demand function with 
alternating regions of increasing and decreasing elasticity, with the expected result of periods of 
alternating too fast and too slow extraction, limited of course by the effects of the above 
mentioned speculation. 
Other forms of imperfect competition have also been studied in some depth, the results, given a 
demand curve with elasticity decreasing as quantity increases, are below optimum initial extraction 
rates. The interested reader can refer to Oasgupta and Heal (1979) for a discussion of various 
models of imperfectly competitive markets. 
2.2.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is pervasive in the field of resource extraction, ranging from the uncertainty of reserves 
to price and demand uncertainty. The literature on this subject is quite large, with many of the 
works deriving results from the use of models based on Bayesian decision theory, and requiring 
8 Note that we are referring to an inverse demand curve. 
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sophisticated mathematical techniques. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give more than a 
brief overview of the major results obtained in this field. 
There are two easy ways ofconsidering uncertainty effects on depletion. The first is to assume the 
existence of an Arrow-Debreu economy, with markets for every commodity in every state of the 
world at every date. In this sort of world, uncertainty would not affect the rate ofdepletion as the 
resource owner knows the price ofhis commodity at every future time, and can insure against 
unforeseen events. Of course this sort ofeconomy does not exist in the real world which has only 
limited contingency markets. 
The second easy way to account for uncertainty effects is to assume that uncertainty is absorbed 
into the discount rate. Thus the more uncertainty a resource owner faces, the higher will be his 
discount rate and the rate of depletion. Fisher (1981) suggests that this may not be an accurate 
reflection of the situation as different kinds of uncertainty may affect depletion rates in different 
ways. He then gives a review of some of the types of uncertainty faced by a resource owner and the 
expected effects on depletion as derived by other researchers. A summary ofthese results is given 
in tabular fonn in Fisher (p. 48) and is reproduced below. 
Kind of uncertainty Effect on depletion 
Uncertain demand for the resource, with 
degree of uncertainty related to distance in 
time from the depletion decision 
Shifts depletion towards the' present. 
Uncertain demand for the resource, with 
variation in expected returns related to 
quantity of output. 
Shifts depletion towards the future. 
Uncertainty regarding the date of event that 
will destroy the value of the resource to the 
owner (e.g., expropriation, discovery of a 
cheaper substitute). 
Shifts depletion towards the present. 
Uncertain size of resource stock.9 Shifts depletion towards the future. 
9 This is for the case where the planner is fears that the deposit may be smaller than what is expected. If 
on the other hand the planner is afraid that the deposit may be bigger than ex-pected, the depletion may 




The above results indicate that uncertainty does not necessarily increase the rate ofdepletion, and it 
is thus not always appropriate to reflect uncertainty by an increase in the discount rate. There is 
also the doubt raised in the previous section about the effect of an increased discount rate: it is 
unclear whether the higher interest rate would speed up depletion in the long run after the negative 
effect of higher interest rates on investment are taken into account. 10 
The existence of uncertainty about future prices, and the need for some estimate of future prices in 
the depletion decision making process, emphasises the role of expectations in resource economics. 
Since expected prices influence the extraction profile, they also affect present prices. There is thus 
a feed back effect between expected prices and present prices. This observation leads to the 
definition of elasticity ofexpectations. Elasticity of expectations can be defined as the percentage 
change in future price divided by the percentage change in present price. In order to ensure an 
equilibrium price path, the elasticity of expectations must be equal to or less than one. With an 
elasticity greater than one, a change in expected future price will result in an explosive price cycle. 
An activity which affects the expected price as well as the present price of any resource by 
changing the levels of uncertainty is exploration. Exploration affects prices in two ways, firstly, as 
suggested, it influences the level of uncertainty, and secondly it can, if successful, increase the 
known size of reserves. Increasing the size of reserves ",ill of course lower prices and the 
deterministic, monotonicly upwards sloping price path suggested by Hotelling may not be realised, 
but have points of falling prices as new discoveries are made. Once again, the literature in this area 
is vast, and this paper can do no more than give a taste of some of the results. 
Exploration can be undertaken to produce additional information about known deposits, or to find 
new deposits. The latter may be undertaken as the level ofknown reserves falls and extraction 
costs begin to rise. The result of successful exploration for new deposits is similar in effect to new 
technology which makes extraction cheaper or makes alternative lower grade deposits viable. 
Exploration and research and development will thus be considered together and be referred to 
simply as exploration. 
10 See appendix A. 
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Exploration makes it possible to augment reserves, perhaps at a faster rate than they are being 
depleted. The following model is due to Pindyck (1978) and presented in Conrad and Clark (1987): 
R =J(w(t), X(t)) - q(t)
Let 
X = J(w(t), X(t)) 
where X(t) is cumulative discoveries, w(t) is exploratory effort and f(*) is a discovery function 
relating new discoveries to exploratory effort and past, cumulative discoveries. It is further usually 
assumed that fw>O and f>«O, i.e. that as exploration and discoveries proceed over time, it becomes 
more difficult to make new discoveries. Assume further that total cost ofextraction per unit time is 
given by C1(R(t»q(t) and the cost ofexploration given by C2(w(t». A competitive resource owner 
then takes price p(t) as exogenous and attempts to maximise 
T
f[p(t)q(t) ­ CI(*)q(t) C2 (w(t))]e -01 dt 
o 
subject to 
R =J(w(t), X(t)) - q(t) 
X = J(w(t), X(t)) 
R(O), X(O) given 
The problem has two state and two control variables, which makes the solution more difficult than 
the problems discussed thus far. The solution is a system of four equations in R, X, P ,w ' 
which lead to several dynamic possibilities. One possibility is that if initial reserves are high, initial 
exploration will be low, increasing as reserves fall. This possibility may result in a price path 
consistent with Hotelling' s result ofmonotonically increasing prices. A second possibility which 
gives a U shaped price path may result if initial reserves are low, giving incentive for high 
exploratory effort. 
Exploration may thus help to explain the observed difference between Hotelling's price path rule, 
and observed past price paths. Swierzbinski and Mendelsohn (1989) introduce a model that allows 
explicit description of the effects of information on resource owners' expectations. This allows 
them to conclude that the forecasted mean rate of change in resource prices is given by Hotelling's 
detenninistic rule, while the observed rate ofchange differs from this due to the arrival of 
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information which changes expectations. Their model thus predicts that Hotelling's rule is 
appropriate for describing how resource o\Wers forecast the value of their stocks, but not for 
predicting actual changes in price. 
The introduction ofexploration into the decision problem also has other effects. Fulton and Just 
(1989) suggest that the existence of two control variables in the depletion problem after exploration 
is included may allow firms to circumvent government controls more easily, specifically, under 
certain circumstances anti-trust policy may have perverse effects. This suggests that the policy 
decisions ofgovernment must allow for the extra control variable in order to achieve their stated 
goals. We will see in the next section how the introduction of mineral processing can have a similar 
result, in that it too adds another control variable to the problem. 
2.3 	 Introducing Government 

Rents and rovalties, the effect of various tax structures 

on optimal extraction together with market imperfections. 

The mineral wealth ofa nation, it is argued, belongs to all the people of that nation. It is thus 
argued that the rents that accrue from the extraction of minerals should be used for the benefit of 
all the people of the state, present and future (i.e. the sustainable development argument). This 
provides the state with an ideal reason to tax the mineral extracting industry, however, it is not the 
only one. Taxes may also be used to influence the extraction profile of minerals in order to attain 
some other policy objectives such as speeding up or slowing do\W extraction, compensating for 
externalities or even encouraging exploration or processing ofore. This implies that a government 
may not always be aiming at a non-distortionary tax that only captures rents. In order to achieve 
these goals, there is a need to understand what the distortionary effects oftaxes are, and if possible 
to estimate the magnitudes ofthese effects. 
A large number of taxes have been studied in the literature, but only a few really dominate. These 
are; the severence tax, per unit tax, ad valorum severance tax, property tax , profits tax and 
depletion allowances. A severence tax is a tax on the ore removed from the ground. It can take the 
form of a fixed payment per unit of metal output (this makes grade selection important), a fixed 
payment per unit ofore extracted or a proportion ofthe metal price (also often called a royalty). 
These are the first three taxes mentioned above, while the profits tax is a payment of some 
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proportion of profits from the sale of output. The property tax is a proportional tax on the value of 
the land the mineral reserves are under. 
Most of the literature approaches the problem from the position that ore is not processed prior to 
sale, and while this simplifies the analysis'1 it has been shown by Slade (1984 and 1986) that when 
extracted ore is processed prior to sale, its taxation has (in some cases) a different effect to that 
when it is taxed in an unprocessed form. 
When the ore is not processed, and the firm is in equilibrium prior to the imposition of any 
taxation, then, "Pre and after-lax extraction patterns will be the same ifand only ifthe present 
value ofthe tax on the marginal unit ofore extracted is equal in all periods." Slade (1986) If the 
present value of the tax on the marginal unit falls (rises), i.e. the tax on the marginal unit 
appreciates slower (faster) than the interest rate, then the resource o\vner has an incentive to delay 
(speed up) extraction. The rule can thus be written as : 
<r extraction is delayed 
T =r the tax is neutral 
T 
>r extraction is accelerated. 
Where T is the tax per unit of ore mined, which varies with time and not extraction, and r is the 
constant interest rate. (Slade '86) 
This rule is used by Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Conrad and Hool (1981) and Heaps (1984) 
amongst others. While Dasgupta and Heal assume an homogeneous ore quality, Conrad and HooI, 
and Heaps do not make this assumption. The results from Conrad and Hool will be described here, 
with a mention of some differing results from Heaps(1984), and later from Krautkraemer (1988). 
Conrad and Hool (1981) analyse the impact of various tax policies on the extraction profiles of 
heterogeneous bodies ofore. The types of taxes considered are given in the table below. It is 
assumed that the tax cannot change the price faced by the extracting firm, so the firm is modelled 
as a price taker. Further, the ore is assumed to be heterogeneous with two grades being modelled. 
11 This goes back to Hotelling who approached the problem from the point of view that the ore body is part 
of a portfolio of assets, and did not look at the price of pure metal in the market. 
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This strengthens the assumption of endogenously detennined reserves. Thus taxes may induce a 
mine to extract only high quality ore and leave low quality ore in the ground. where it accrues no 
rent. 
The grading profile derived in the absence of taxes corresponds to the profile of discounted prices, 
with the highest grades taken when discounted prices are highest, and lower grades taken 
"sequentially in like manner until further extraction is no longer profitable." (Conrad and Hool '81 
p 20) This implies a cut-off grade below which it is not profitable to extract. If prices are not 
assumed to rise monotonically, then the cut offgrade may be extracted prior to higher grade ores, 
so in general it cannot be said that the mine closes once the cut off grade ore bas been e:\.1:racted. In 
order to simplify their analysis, Conrad and Hool assume a price path that guarantees that high 
grade ore is extracted first in the absence of taxes12. The results given below would change if this 
assumption were changed. 
Heaps (1984) offers some additional results, the basic one being that: taxes increase extraction 
rates, reduce cut off time and increase the cut offgrade. There are exceptions to this result, these 
being: a profit tax that decreases over time, a progressive tax rate and some royalty policies. These 
taxes have the opposite effect. These differences from the regular results are due to different 
transversality conditions, i.e. mining stops due to exhaustion vs. mining stops due to it being 
uneconomic to continue. (The latter is assumed by Heaps.) Another difference is found in the case 
of a property tax case compared to Conrad and Hool (1981). The difference is that Conrad and 
Hool find that a property tax increases cumulative extraction, while Heaps obtains the opposite 
result. This discrepancy is due to Conrad and Hool' s assumption of fixed lifespan of operation as 
opposed to the possibility of a shortened lifespan assumed in Heaps's paper. 
Krautkraemer ( 1988) studies the effects of tax on ore grade selection in some depth. The major 
result that he derives is that in the presence ofheterogeneous ore grades, the usual result ofa 
conservation effect due to a severence tax is diminished and often reversed. A tax induced 
reduction in total recovery becomes more serious as low grade ore is not recovered even if the tax 
is removed at a later date. 
12 This would be the norm under HoteHing's assumptions. 
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The following table is a summary of results presented in Conrad and Hool( 1981 p. 31): 
Ta.x Grade selection Reserves /Higb- Extraction Urofi1e 
urofilel3 grading effects}14 
Per unit severance on 
output 
Present to future Decreased Present to future 
Per unit severance on 
ore 
None Decreased Present to future 
Ad Valorum severance None Decreased Depends on path of 
discounted prices 
Profits tax with cost 
depletion 15 
Future to present Increased Future to present 
Profits tax with 
percentage depletion l6 
None Increased Depends on path of 
discounted prices 
Property tax Future to present Increased Future to present 
While many have studied the theoretical effects ofa tax on extraction profiles, with the directions 
of bias being derived, there has not been a major attempt to calculate the relative sizes of these 
biases. An exception is the efforts of Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1985). Thesewriters study the 
relative efficiency and equity of unit, yield, property, and windfall profits taxes applied to non­
renewable resources. A partial equilibrium simulation model is solved in order to compare the 
effects of each of these taxes, which are then compared on the basis of the size of the welfare loss 
in which each results. The equity ofdistribution of the welfare effects between producers and 
consumers is also analysed. The Results oftheir analysis were as follows: ­
• 	 A yield tax was found to be most efficient, unless the base price of a windfall profits tax is set 
close to the extraction costs. 
• 	 Unit and property taxes are the least efficient. 
13 This refers to how the tax affects when the highest grade ore is extracted. 

14 This refers to how the cut-off grade is affected by the tax, thus reserves decrease for the first tax as the 

cut-off grade is increased. 





16 Percentage depletion is defined as a fixed proportion ofthe current value of output. 
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• All taxes fall primarily on the owners, with the burden of property and windfall profits taxes 
on producers exceeding 100 percent. This implies that these types of taxes can even make 
consumers better off. 
Some other interesting results in this field ofstudy that are relevant to this paper are due to 
Livernois (1991), Kolstad and Wolak (1983), Campbell and Lindner (1985) and Slade (1984 and 
(986). John Livernois offers some insight into the effects of tax brackets on extraction profiles. 
Tax brackets are used as an apparently innocuous way of approximating a non-linear tax system. 
Livernois found that these tax brackets have unexpected dynamic effects on the extraction profile. 
Specifically, he found that tax brackets in profits and severance tax systems result in periods where 
extraction rates are held constant. This is in contrast to the expected monotonically declining 
extraction path. 
The results of Kolstad and Wolak are of particular relevance to South Africa17, They study the 
effects of interregional competition for taxes, and find that this kind of competition can greatly 
reduce the amount of rent that can be extracted in comparison to the rents extractable by a cartel. 
They conclude however, that the reduction is not sufficiently large to imply that a cartel is 
necessary. 
Earlier in this chapter the effects ofexploration on the extraction path were noted. Campbell and 
Lindner (85) offer some insights into the effects of taxation on exploration by the firm. The results 
from their work can be summarised in the following set of propositions: 18 
1. 	 If the firm is risk neutral then the imposition ofsirnple form of resource rent tax leaves 
exploration effort unchanged provided the exploration costs are fully offset against taxable 
income. On the other hand, ifexploration costs can only be partially offset against taxable 
income, the effect of the resource rent tax will be to reduce exploration ofdeposits that are 
expected a priori to be profitable; 
2. 	 in the absence of a resource tax the more risk averse the firm is, ceteris paribus, the more 
effort it will devote to exploring 'promising' deposits and less to 'unpromising' ones; 
17 The level of relevance will be determined by the powers allocated to the provinces in the new 
constitution. Ifwe move towards a greater degree offederacy, then the provinces may have greater power 
in determining province specific mineral taxes. This is when a degree of competitiveness may develop. 
18 Campbell and Lindner (1985) p. 159. 
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3. 	 in the case of the risk a verse finn, the higher the rate of resource rent tax with full loss offset, 
the less effort the finn will devote to exploring 'promising' deposits and the more to 
'unpromising' ones. 
As mentioned above, most of the literature approaches resource taxation with the assumption that 
the tax falls directly on the unprocessed ore. Slade (1984 & 1986) approaches the problem from 
the perspective that the ore is processed to some degree after extraction and prior to sale. There are 
thus other inputs into the extraction and processing cost functions besides ore. The model presented 
by Slade (1984) is less restrictive than most in that it allows for less restrictive extraction and 
processing tecimology, depletion effects (costs increase with cumulative extraction), less than 
complete depletion of the ore body (cut offgrades), multiple grades and multiple outputs (by­
products and coproducts)19. She found that when ore is combined with other inputs in the 
processing stage, the effects of taxes and subsidies is to change the extraction rates and processing 
intensities in opposite ways. Thus for example she finds that the imposition of a royalty causes 
both cumulative ore extraction and the intensity of processing to fall, leading to a greater decrease 
in metal output than ore extraction. A severence tax on the other hand causes cumulative extraction 
to fall while processing intensity rises. Metal output thus falls by a smaller amount than ore 
extraction (this because ore has become relatively more expensive than other inputs).> 
In her 1986 paper, Slade introduces a methodology for finding the effect of taxes on ore extraction 
when these taxes are levied at various stages of production. The model she uses assumes a 
vertically integrated finn which extracts and refines ore and sells metal. In this situation, a tax 
policy is said to be absolutely neutral if it does not affect the extraction rate of ore, the marginal 
rate of technical substitution between ore and the other inputs into the production process and the 
rate of output of metal. A tax policy is said to be relatively neutral if it leaves the extraction rate 
unchanged. 
19 Although Slade's model allows for a much greater degree of certainty concerning the effects of the 
imposition of a tax than earlier models, it will not be used to evaluate tax policies later in this paper. The 
reason for this is that the tax on most of the South African mines is a neutral, flat rate profits tax, and 
where there is proposed change it is in favour of a formula tax system such as the one presently used for 
gold mines in South Africa. The effects of this formula tax are quite well understood and as such it is felt 
that it is not necessary to use a new model to evaluate it. 
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The effects of taxes which are levied downstream on metal production or metal revenues must be 
traced backwards in order to find equivalent taxes on extraction. Slade thus finds mappings to 
translate downstream taxes into direct taxes on ore. The study is limited to cases for which the tax 
is independent of the extraction rate, as taxes which depend on the extraction rate give producers 
an incentive to alter extraction rates to lower their tax burden and thus can not be neutral. 
The analysis is extended to consider the effects of taxes upon extraction when levied on finns using 
different production technologies, and the derivation of a method for deriving tax policies that 
achieve specific goals such as neutrality, conservation or increased depletion. While it is possible to 
design a tax that is neutral for an industry, it will not be neutral for every finn unless each finn 
uses identical technology. Slade also notes that in order to avoid counter intuitive effects, it would 
be beneficial to levy the tax on a stage of production that is as close to extraction as possible. 
Unfortunately the details of this work are beyond the scope of this paper, and the interested reader 
is thus referred to Slade (1986) for the details of the analysis. 
Before moving on to the next chapter which details some of the real world tax experiences, it is of 
some great interest to note a case described by Dore (1987). Dore's paper highlights a point that is 
not given much attention in the literature, and that is the ability of monopoly or highly concentrated 
producers to influence the tax policy that they face. In the case described by Dore, the world 
bauxite producer oligopoly effectively reallocated production in response to Jamaican resource rent 
taxation. The oligopoly introduced a successful strategy of exploration and time phasing of bauxite 
production world wide which allowed them to avoid the high tax policy of the Caribbean members 
of the International Bauxite Association. Bauxite production in Jamaica was reduced in favour of 
production in Australia, Guinea and Brazil. The effect on Jamaica has been to reduce per capita 
income to such an extent that in 1980 per capita income was 25 percent below what it had been in 
1972. 
While the kind of concentrated producer power that prevails in this sector is not common, the 
power of concentrated producers to influence tax policy, or to reallocate production to avoid taxes 
should not be ignored, and deserves further study.20 
20 See appendix B for a brief discussion of concentration in South African mining. 
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3. Real world tax examples 
3.1 South Africa 
3.1.1 Minerals background 
South Africa is endowed with exceptional mineral resource reserves, and has been described as a 
country of "geological superlatives". These resources are mainly concentrated in only six 
geological units, namely: 
1) The Witwatersrand (2.6-2.9 Ga ): gold and uranium 

2) The Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC) (2.1 Ga): platinum group metals (Pt, Pd, Rh, Ru, Ir, 

as), chromium, vanadium, iron and titanium (not produced). 
3) The Transvaal (Griqualand West) (2.4 Ga): manganese and iron. 
4) The Karoo (O.18~O.25 Ga): coal and uranium (not mined) 
5) Kimberlite pipes (intrusive, various ages): diamonds 
6) Coastal Sands (recent): titanium, pig iron, zircon and silica. 
In general the mineral potential has been realised and mineral production reflects 

mineral reserves. By far the most important mineral in terms of value is gold. 

This is followed by coal, platinum, diamonds, iron ore and copper. However 

many of these minerals are beneficiated before export in which case the order 

would be gold, iron and steel, PGMs (and by-products), coal and ferro-alloys. In 

terms of global output the minerals for which South Africa's share is greater 

than one-fifth are: platinum (67%), rhodium (63%), vanadium (50%), chromium 

(38%), palladium (31 %), gold (28%) and titanium (22%).21 22 

The following table shows South Africa's position in terms of world mineral reserves. As is evident 
from the table, South Africa has the world's largest reserves for six major minerals, namely, 
manganese, the platinum group metals (PGMs), chromium, vanadium, gold and alumino-silicates. 
In addition, South Africa has substantial reserves of many other minerals such as iron ore, coal and 
base metals. 
21 ANC Minerals and Energy Policy Workshop: Draft Mineral and Energy Policy, 
Discussion Document, November 1994 
22 Further statistics on South African production, exports and reserves, see Appendix C. 
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South Africa: ROLE IN WORLD MINERAL RESERVES23 
SA Reserve Base as % ofWorld 30/6/91 Rank 
Manganese 82 1 
PGM 69 1 
IChromium 54 1 
Gold 40 1 
Alumino-allicates 37 1 
Vanadium 33 1 
Zirconium 14 2 
IFluorspar 10 4 
Coal 9 5 
!Nickel 9 5 
Titanium 8 5 
Phosphate rock 7 3 
Iron 6 7 
Zinc 5 4 
Lead 4 6 
Antimony 3 6 
Vermiculite na 2 
Uranium na 6 
Asbestos na 4 
Diamonds na 4 
3.1.2 Taxation of South African Mines 24 
The mining income of a company (not an individual) is taxed differently to other income. The 
system is full of anomalies as different minerals are treated differently, however, despite these 
23 Source:- Chamber of Mines 
24 Adapted from The Margot Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of South Africa. This section 
offers a description of the major tax principles affecting the South African mining industry in the recent 
past and present. 
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complexities, there are some general principles that are universal to the mining industry, and these 
are described below, followed by a description of some of the tax rules for different minerals. 
3.1,2, I Mining Leases 
Prior to 1991, all rights to mine precious stones and precious metals were vested in the state and a 
lease was required to mine such minerals. The state share of profits that was payable in respect of 
the lease was calculated on a sliding scale of the same form as the gold tax formula. As the form 
and thus the effects of the gold tax formula and the lease formula were the same, only the gold 
formula will be discussed. All lease payments of this form ended in 1993. 
The rights to mine all minerals other than precious stones and precious metals were vested in the 
holder of the mineral rights to the land in question. If the land was privately held, then these rights 
were normally held by the owner of the land, if state land was in question, the mineral rights 
belonged to the state. 
Since 1991, the right to mine any mineral has been vested in the owner ofthe mineral rights, i.e. the 
state no longer reserves the right to mine precious stones and precious metals. 
3, 1.2.2 Redemption of Capital Expenditure 
The redemption allowance referred to here is the deduction of capital expenditure from revenue 
before tax. Capital expenditure is thus expensed or written off. The redemption allowance was 
granted for both tax and lease purposes. Before ring fencing was introduced, the full amount of 
capital expenditure could be deducted in a single year. 
Redeemable capital includes: 
-capital expenditure on shaft sinking 
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-development, general administmtive and management costs (including interest and 
other charges) incurred prior to the commencing of production, or during any period of 
non-production25 • 
The reasons given for the redemption allowance are:­
-Most of the capital spent on mining goes into infrastructure to facilitate mining, this capital has no 
residual value 

-Assets such as surface plant are generally wasting assets, in terms of the fact that the ore body has 

a limited life 

-The long lag between the start of capital investment and the generating of returns from that capital 

-The risk profile of mining means that development is dependent on risk capital 





-The allowance thus serves to reduce investor risk. 

Ring fencing was introduced in 1984 to prevent capital expenditure being deducted from income 
other than from mining, and was later extended to prevent deductions from income other than from 
the specific mine the capital was invested in. Any excess could be carried over for deduction in 
following years. Mines could thus not fully expense capital expenditure in a single year. The fences 
were not impenetrable to normal revenue losses. The fences were initially erected in order to 
prevent the erosion of the tax base, however, they are being removed (the industry is making a 
strong case for their complete removal), and there is now a 25% breach of the fence permissible in 
certain circumstances. 
The reasons given for the removal of the fences are: 
- To allow capital to move freely to its most efficient use, and not to where it does the 
most good in reducing the investor's tax burden; 
25 There is no redemption allowance for the purchase of land or mineral rights. 
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- To give credit for the riskiness of the investment in mines 
- The immediate write-off of capital is simpler to administer 

- A write-off over the life of the mine would involve contentious estimates of life span. 

3.1.2.3 Capital Allowance 
Capital redemption is a write-off of actual capital expenditure, while the capital allowance is a 
notional addition to such expenditure, i.e. mines were effectively allowed to recover capital and 
interest. The system allows for an annual inflation of the initial capital investment until such time 
as the mine is generating enough profit to redeem such capital. The capital allowance was 
introduced in the 1950's to encourage the development ofdeep level gold mining, and is currently 
exclusive to the gold mining industry. 
The effect of the capital allowance and the redemption allowance is to lower the price of capital 
invested in mining. Due to these tax breaks, investment can be financed at interest rates far below 
market rates, and with high inflation rates, it is likely that they face negative real rates of interest. 
This of course has a bearing on the discussion on interest rates given in appendix A, where it is 
suggested that if mines use the market rate of interest in their investment and extraction decisions 
and the market rate of interest is higher than the social rate, then the increased extraction rate 
induced by the higher rate may be offset by the reduced investment in mining due to the same 
higher rate. If the Government puts a wedge between the rate used for investment decisions and the 
rate used for extraction decisions, specifically, if the former is lowered by the tax. system as is the 
case in South Africa, then there will be excess investment and faster extraction. These two effects 
obviously result in a tendency towards extraction ofthe resources being too fast when compared to 
our benchmark for social welfare. In the absence of any other force (such as monopoly power) to 
slow down extraction, the result would be a definite increase in extraction as compared to the 
benchmark. This result may be in conflict with the State's policy of lengthening the lifespan of 
mineral reserves and mining as a whole! 
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3.1.2.4 Mines Other than Gold and Diamonds 
These mines pay a (neutral) flat rate companies tax of 40%, plus 15% on distributed profits, giving 
an effective rate of 47.83% on profits that are distributed. This dual tax system was introduced in 
an attempt to encourage mines to re-invest their profits. The success of this dual tax is however 
debatable, since mines traditionally payout all or most oftheir profits. 
3.1.2.5 Diamond Mines 
Diamond mine income was taxed at a (neutral) flat rate of 40% with a 25% surcharge, giving an 
effective rate of 56.25%. This has changed to a flat rate of 40% plus 15% on distributed profits as 
for other minerals. In addition there is an export duty of 15% on the value ofexported unpolished 
stones. This duty is tax deductible, and generates more revenue than the company tax on diamond 
mining enterprises. The duty is purported to be a protective one, in place to encourage the domestic 
diamond cutting and polishing industry. 
3.1.2.6 Gold Mines 
Probably the most striking feature of the South African mining tax system is the gold mine tax 
formula, and most of the attention of this chapter will thus be focused on it. The formula dates 
back (not in an unbroken line) to the Mining Taxation Act 6 of 1910, and taxes mines on a sliding 
scale, introducing an element of cross-subsidisation to the tax system, with the state taking a larger 
share of profits from richer mines, and a smaller share from poorer mines. The reason the formula 
was introduced, was to encourage mines to work lower average grades ofore than they would 
otherwise do in the absence of the tax, and thus extend the working lives of the mines. What the 
formula in effect does is to pay the producers to deliberately make a loss by mining ore of a lower 
grade than would be mined in absence of the ta.x. This is because the loss made on mining this low 
grade ore is more than offset by resultant the tax savings. The mines make the profits cake smaller 
so as to have a bigger slice than they had before, at the expense of the fisc. 26 The formula allows 
the mines to make a moderate but predictable return on their capital, and taxes away the rest. 
Obviously this is an attempt to extract the rents from gold mining, but is far from neutral and even 
26 A numerical description of this phenomenon is presented in Appendix D. 
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reduces the amount of the rent. The fisc thus sacrifices some of the rent in order to extend the life 
of the mines. 
The fonnula is of the fonn: 
T = % ofgold profits that goes to government 
=A - ABIX 
Where A is a constant (60) and 8 is one of two constants depending on the age of the mine. (The 
value of 8 determines the maximum amount of profit as a percentage of gross revenue which a 
mine can earn before paying tax.) There are thus two primary versions of the fonnula, one for pre­
1966 (8=6) mines, and one for post-l 966 (8=8) mines. These are also referred to as the "360 
fonnula mines" and the "480 fonnula mines" respectively. X is the ratio (expressed as a 
percentage) of profits to revenue. 
Since March of 1993, gold mines were given the option of staying with the present tax system, or 
moving to a new system with lower tax rates on non-mining income, a more favourable fonnula, 
but including a 15% dividends tax. Given that a high proportion of pre-tax profits are paid out as 
dividends, it is unlikely that the mines will change from the old system. Nattrass (1995) 
Since earnings are equal to average grade milled times tons of ore milled times the price received 
for output (E =Average grade x Tons ore milled x P), and the cost of processing a ton of ore is 
generally independent of its grade, the mines can set their earnings by choosing the grade of ore to 
mine21. This lead to the inverse relationship between the gold price and the grade of ore mined.28 As 
can be seen from the table below however, this relationship did not hold well during the 1980's, 
probably due to the fluctuating gold price and the limited ability of mine nUmagers to switch 
mining activities between ore bodies ofdifferent grades. Despite the fluctuations in the real rand 
gold price, ore grades fell steadily until 1989. Only after 1989 did ore grades begin to rise. Nattrass 
(1995) 
27 Or they can mine ore at a greater depth, as this will raise the cost of mi rung the ore, which has the same 
effect as mining a lower grade. (See Appendix D for more detail.) 
28 Moll (1992) p. 188 
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Real Rand Gold Price, Working Costs, Profits and Taxation19 
Gold mines belonging to the Chamber of Mines 






























1981 l37 325.2 142.5 182.6 6.92 34.4 26.4 
1982 122 275 140.4 135 6.76 30.5 14.3 
1983 126 273.3 137.3 136 6.55 32.4 9.3 
1984 126 265.4 139.6 125.8 6.44 29.8 10.8 
1985 145 283.5 140.1 143.6 6.09 29.8 8.1 
1986 146 271.3 137.8 133.5 5.63 30.6 10.2 
1987 l36 237.3 140.4 96.9 5.28 32.5 9.1 
1988 131 224.5 140.2 84.5 5.13 31.8 7 
1989 115 184.4 133.5 50.9 4.99 39.1 4.5 
1990 100 163.5 130.3 33.2 5.05 39.4 2.2 
• 1991 87 148.4 ll8 30.4 5.2 34.4 1.2 
1992 77 136.1 109.9 26.2 5.37 38.5 1 
• 1993 81 160 118.8 41.2 5.56 35.2 0.7 
Where the real gold price and the grade are inversely related, there is the possibility ofa downward 
sloping supply curve for gold in South Africa. This is because with a lower grade being mined, the 
mine would have to mill a greater volume of ore to produce a constant amount ofgold. To the 
extent that the ability to increase the tonnage miUed is limited, there is a likelihood that the tonnage 
:9 Nattrass (1995) pp. 858 & 859 
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could not be increased enough to compensate for the lower ore grade. An indication of the effects 
of different ore grades on gold output is given by the following table30 . (Statistics are for four 































June 241 6.71 1618 324.31 48306 45461 3255 -11875 -7 
March 257 5.86 1505 394.37 50267 44001 -410 -10745 -7.7 
Blyvooruitzicht 
June 137 6.31 864 274.84 43580 44994 982 -562 -2.3 
March 125 6.3 788 285.86 51389 45317 -3851 -5322 -22.1 
Harmony 
June 1405 3.48 4892 152.13 43693 45681 15842 984 3.4 
March 1470 3.2 4702 139.32 43530 43054 5613 -9293 -32.6 
Durban Deep 
June 63 3.75 236 191.32 51107 45157 -1221 -96 -4.1 
March 63 4.29 270 185.12 43195 43195 93 -1422 -61.8 
-­ -
As can be seen in the cases of the ERPM and Harmony mines, with the higher ore grades being 
mined, more gold is produced despite a lower tonnage of ore being milled. This gives some 
indication of the kind of effect that can be obtained by changing ore grades. Thus, unless the tons 
of ore milled increases (falls) by the same percentage as average ore grade falls (rises), gold supply 
moves in the opposite direction to real gold prices: as a result, if the gold price goes up, the share 
of gold in nominal GDP may rise as the value of gold mined rises, while its share of actual output 
in the economy falls as there is less gold actually produced! Moll (1992) 
At present, South African gold mines are struggling for survival as costs of production rise and the 
gold price fails to strengthen. In the past these pressures on profitability have been dealt with by 
merging mines, concentrating on higher ore grades, continuous working (this method is being 
seriously hampered by public holidays, with JeI estimating that 16 - 18 working days are lost due 
to these holidays) and decentralisation of management. Each of these strategies is limited, and the 
mines will have to find new ways of lowering costs and lowering the payable ore grade if they wish 
to continue operating. Previously the incentive to lower costs was reduced by the tax system, and 
now the price for that lowered incentive is being paid. 
30 Urquart (1995) 
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3.1.3 Comments 
The current flat rate profits taxes on minerals other than gold are neutral in that they do not alter 
the profile of discounted returns, i.e. they do not give the mine owners any incentive to change their 
extraction profiles from the one they would choose if the tax were absent. The case ofgold is 
however much different, with the formula tax altering the grade selection profile as well as the 
extraction profile, and (in theory) extending the life of the mine. "In theory" because in reality there 
is no guarantee that prices will continue to rise faster than costs and that the expected life span of 
the mine will be realised. 
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4. Minerals policy in The New South Africa 
The ANC has no definite minerals policy, its last statement on the minerals issue was a draft 
document for the ANC Minerals and Energy Policy Workshop in November of 1994, and was 
labelled "for discussion". It is this document, and some of the more definite policy statements 
which will be referred to in this section. 
4.1 First a look at general ANC policy as it pertains to minerals 
4.1.1 Environmental Policv3l 
The ANC believes that all citizens ofSouth Africa, present and future, have the right to a safe and 
healthy environment, and to a life of well-being. The broad objective ofour environmental policy 
will be to fulfil this right. In this context, growth and development within South Africa will be 
based on the principles of sustainability. 
2. Guiding Principles 
The ANC subscribes to the following principles: 
2.1 the principle of sustainable development~ 
2.2 equitable access to resources; 
2.3 public participation in planning, development and management of resources; 
2.4 an integrated approach to environmental issues that relates to aU sectors of society; 
2.5 public right of access to information and the courts on issues of environmental concern. 
3. Objectives 
3.1 Adequate protection, conservation and restoration of resources, based on the following: 
3.1.3 The sustainable utilisation of renewable resources. 
3.1.4 The rational utilisation of non-renewable resources. 
31 The whole of section 4.1.1 consists of Quoted sections from the ANC Policy Guidelines, F. The 
Environment. Only sections directly relevant to the minerals sector are quoted. 
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4. Functional Priorities 
Bearing in mind the national development priorities (namely employment creation, housing, 
food security, rural and urban development, macro-economic balances, peace and stability), the 
ANC's environmental programme will initially focus on: 
4.5 	 The introduction of measures and campaigns intended to curb pollution generated by 
agriculture, mining, industry and any other activities; 
4.6 	 The introduction of measures to counter the privatisation or removal of public rights to 
common natural resources such as forests, the coastline, water, mountains and wildlife 
resources: 
4.7 	 The establishment of an inventory of our natural resources; 
4.1.2 Minerals Policv32 
In order to promote. support and regulate minerals and mining it is essential that government 
institutions are competent and effiCient. Exploration and mining are high risk businesses and 
consequently it is important that individuals and companies are confident in their dealings with 
state institutions and that decisions are made timeously and efficiently. Ifcontracts- are to be 
negotiated and investment mobilised it will be important that institutions respond rapid~v and 
professionally. 
In South Africa there has been Significant white private sector involvement in the minerals and 
mining sector. Consequently the mining ministry has tended to take a back seat to the much more 
influential industries represented for example byfinance and trade. Equally the functions ofthis 
ministry have become one ofpolicing and regulating the industry and there has been little 
emphaSis on promotion ofminerals and mining. As a result government departments, and 
statutory bodies have tended to be looked upon as unhelpful bureaucrats who frequently became 
obstacles to ongOing and effective policy reform and new commercial endeavour. The private 
mining companies also played the role ofpromoters and salesmen for the industry, and although 
much good was done and ,South Africa has a highly developed large scale mining industry. very 
often the needs ofindividuals and communities, and the state were overlooked or ignored. 
32 Sections ~.1.2 and 4.2 consist of quoted sections of the ANC Minerals and Energy Policy Workshop 
Draft Mineral and Energy Policy. Discussion Document of November 1994. All the quoted material is 
presented in italics 
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The country is relatively well explored and it is unlikely that new major deposits will be found. 
While iron ore, coal, the platinum group metals and chromite have a long term future. the gold 
mining and diamond mining industries are mature and will decline in the longer term. As these 
two minerals represent about two-thirds oftotal value, employment and contribution to the 
balance ofpayments and other aspects ofthe economy, this presents a major economic and 
political problem for the future. Awareness ofthis problem andfarsighted planning around the 
downscaling ofthe industry is essential. The priorities facing the industry include: 
• 	 management ofthe downscaling ofthe industry in terms ofemployment: 
• 	 the extension ofthe life ofwhat mineral resources remain: 
• 	 the discovery ofnew resources through investment in exploration: 
• 	 the exploitation ofknown. but unexploited, mineral deposits: 
• 	 increased focus on the optimisation ofmineral exploitation: 
• 	 increased incentives to add value to minerals prior to export. and disincentives for exporting 
unbenejiciated ores. 
ANC mineral policy is centred on the Freedom Charter of1955 which states that: . 
"The People shall share in the country's wealth", and that 
"The mineral wealth beneath the soil ... shall be transforred to the people as a whole. " 
This was amplified at the Ready to Govern Conference in 1992 which stated: 
"The mineral wealth beneath the soil is the national heritage ofall South Africans. including 
future generations. As a diminishing resource it should be used with due regard to socio­
economic needs and environmental conservation. The ANe will, in consultation with unions and 
employers, introduce a mining strategy which will involve the introduction ofa new system of 
taxation, jinancing, mineral rights and leasing. 
Policies will be developed to integrate the mining industry with other sectors ofthe economy by 
encouraging mineral benejiciation and the creation ofa world class mining and mineral 
processing capital goods industry." 
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The key policy themes are firstly that minerals in the ground are part ofthe nation's wealth. that 
workers and the nation should get their fair share ofthe wealth generated and that minerals 
mined are integrated into the rest ofthe economy through further processing (beneficiation) 
before export. 
The ANC's minerals policy was significantly further developed at the ReconstnlCtion and 
Development Programme Conference in Febnlary 199{ together with the Alliance Partners, 
which adopted the following 14 policy points: 
1) 	South Africa is one ofthe world's richest countries in terms ofminerals. Up to now. however, 
this enormous wealth has only been usedfor the benefit ofthe tiny white minority. 
2) The minerals in the ground belong to all South Africans. including future generations. 
Moreover. the current system ofminer.al rights prevents the optimal development ofmining 
and the appropriate use ofurban land. We seek the return o.fprivate mineral rights to the 
democratic government. in line with the rest ofthe world. This must be done in full 
consultation with all stakeholders. 
3) 	 Gur principal objective is to transform mining and mineral-processing industries to serve all 
o.four people. We can achieve this goal through a variety ofgovernment interventions. 
incentives and disincentives. Estimates suggest that the establishment ofa govemment 
minerals marketing auditors' office and the national marketing ofcertain minerals would 
enable South Africa to realise greater foreign-exchange earnings. The management and 
marketing ofour minerals exports must be examined together with employers. unions and the 
government to ensure maximum benefits for our country. 
4) 	Minerals and mineral products are our most important source offoreign exchange and the 
success ofour RDP will in part depend on the ability ofthis sector to expand exports to avoid 
balance ofpayments constraints in the short to medium term. 
5) Mining and minerals products contribute three-quarters ofour exports and the industry 
employs three-quarters ofa million workers, but this could be much higher ifour raw 
materials were processed into intermediate andfinished products before export. Our RDP 
must attempt to increase the level ofmineral benefiCiation through appropriate incentives and 
disincentives in order to increase employment and add in value to our natural resources 
before export. Moreover, this policy should provide more appropriate inputs for 
manufacturing in South Africa. 
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6) 	Minerals are a vital input for numerous mineral-based industries. These industries. however, 
have difJiculty in becoming internationally competitive due to the fact that the refining 
companies usually set higher prices for the domestic market than their export prices. a 
practice known as import parity pricing. A democratic government must consider mechanisms 
to encourage companies to sell to local industries at prices that will enhance their 
international competitiveness. 
7) 	 Existing tripartite structures such as the Mining Summit must be strengthened in order to 
facilitate national development strategies for the mining and mineral-processing industry. 
8) Democratisation ofthe mining sector must involve new laws to build workplace democracy 
for miners by requiring employers to negotiate the organisation ofwork with their employees 
and their unions. Programmes must be established to allow financial participation by workers 
in mining companies in a meaningfit/ way (including measures to influence the poliCies of 
financial institutions. especially insurance companies and penSion funds. which hold 
Significant stakes in the mining sector and in which our people have substantial investments). 
And anti-trust legislation and other measures must be implemented to permit the monitoring 
and appropriate control ofmining, mineral processing and marketing. 
9) International demand and supply patterns for metals and minerals have undergone 
fondamental changes in recent years that necessitate the restructuring ofthis major industry. 
In the medium term, this probably means a continued decline in the number ofpeople 
employed in the mines. Up to now, the heaviest burdens associated with down-scaling have 
been borne by miners, one third ofwhom have been retrenched. The RDP must put into place 
mechanisms to ensure orderly down-scaling ofour mines so as to minimise the suffering of 
workers and their families. Measures should include the reskilling and training ofworkers 
for other forms ofemployment. 
10) Mining is a hard and dangerous job, and mineworkers labour under stressfol conditions, 
often deep under the earth. The RDP envisages a new set ofminimum standards for the 
mining industry that ensure fair wages and employment conditions for all workers and a 
health and safety system that recognises the special hazards related to mining. 
11) Most mineworkers are forced to live in single-sex hostels and remit part their salaries. In 
foture all workers must have the right to live at or near their place ofwork in decent 
accommodation and shall have foil control over their after-tax salaries. In addition, the 
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mining companies must take some responsibility for the education, training and social needs 
ofminers and their families as an integral part oflabour policy on the mines. 
12) Mining can be extremely destnlctive ofour natural environment. Our policy is to make 
the companies that reap the profits from mining responsible for all environmental damage. 
Existing legislation must be strengthened to ensure that our environment is protected. Before 
a new mine can be established there must be a comprehensive environmental impact study. 
13) The Southern African region also has enormous mineral resources that have not been 
mined, due in part to the destabilisation policies pursued by the apartheid state in the last 
twenty years. In the spirit ofmutual co-operation, the RDP should extend across our borders 
by using our conSiderable expertise in mineral exploration and exploitation to rehabilitate 
and develop the mineral potential ofour neighbours. In this regard a special facility should 
be created to promote investment in the sub-continent. 
14) The government must consider ways and means to encourage small-scale mining and 
enhance opportunities for participation by our people through support. includingjinancial 
and technical aid and access to mineral rights. However. standards in respect ofthe 
environment, health, and saftty and other working conditions must be maintained. 
4.2 Description of proposed minerals policy 
4.2.1 Draft Environmental Policy for the Minerals Industrv 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue ofenvironmental management in the industry is at present largely neglected. Mines are 
by nature damaging to the environment. and until recently there has been little effective control 
over environmental management on mines. The Minerals Act of1991 introduced, for the jirst 
time, law on environmental regulation and rehabilitation. The problems faced by the State in the 
management ofmines which closed down prior to the promulgation ofthis Act. primarily the old 
coal and deep level gold mines, is sufficient motivation in itself to ensure that mines take 
responsibility for their own environmental management during the operation ofthe mine. and 
ensure that the property has been rehabilitated to the extent that it does not pose a threat to the 
physical environment and the community on closure. 
The ANe's policy on environmental management. as expressed in it's document "An 
introduction to ANC Environmental Policy". states that the ANC believes that all citizens. 
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present and future. have the right to a life ofwell being. Any environmental policy for the 
minerals industry must incorporate this fundamental philosophy. 
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 




• 	 potentially cross-cutting environmental legislation and regulation introduced by difforent 
State department's and private members motions; 
• 	 the management ofenvironmental damage caused by small-scale mines; 
• 	 the establishment and administration ofrehabilitation funds: 
• 	 acid mine drainage from the sulphur-rich gold and coal mines; 




• 	 future trade barriers could be based on the environmental effects ofour production 

methods that do not take into consideration environmental degradation 

POLICY 
1. 	 Mining can be very destructive to the environment. There must be a balance between the 
economic benefits ofa mine development and the ecological damage caused. The basic 
principle must be that the mining companies should be responsible for the rehabilitation of 
a closed down mine site. 
2. 	 To introduce State-managed water management schemes in catchment areas affected by 
acid mine drainage, the costs ofwhich would be met on a pro-rata basis determined by 
water quantity and quality, as is done for the SIMRAC programme; 
3. 	 To provide for broader consultation on mining environmental issues at planning and 
EMPR stage. particularly with the communities directly affected by the mining; 
4. 	 To educate small-scale miners on environmental management as a pre-requisite to being 
granted mining authorisation; 
5. 	 To provide for State management ofareas where there is a high spatial concentration of 
small-scale miners; 
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6. 	 To investigate the feasibility ofa one-stop shop for processing mining-related 
environmentallegislalion and regulation through the establishment ofthe DMEA as the 
lead agent with seconded professionals from the Departments ofEnvironmental A/fairs. 
Water Affairs and Forestry, and Agriculture; 
7. 	 To create mine-specific trust funds instead ofthe current format ofrehabilitation fonds. 
and to have these funds to cover ail aspects ofmining impact, managed by boards of 
trustees which would include ail stakeholders. particularly the affected communities; 
8. 	 To make the funds more affordable by replacing the up-front single sum guarantee by a 
production related Sinking fund based on estimates ofcosts ofrehabilitation at cessation 
ofoperations. 
9. 	 To investigate applying a mining levy. part ofwhich should be used to repair past damage 
where the perpetrator cannot be identified and future damage that cannot be linked to a 
specific producer. 
10. The polluter pays' principle should apply to all impacts ofmining activities. 
11. 	 South Africa should endeavour to ensure that the environmental policy complies with 
international norms for mining. 
4.2.2 Draft Policy on Mining Taxation 
INTRODUCTION 
Minerals are one part ofa country's natural wealth or patrimony for which users must pay rent 
to the people' or state to deplete (mine). The State derives its share ofrent from the industry 
through both the taxation levied on the industry, as well as income from rentals on State-owned 
mineral rights. Such rentals are in effect what are termed royalties elsewhere in the world where 
the mineral rights belong to the state. Royalties to compensate the state for the depletion ofits 
mineral wealth are generally calculated on the volume or value (sales) ofthe mineral mined. In 
the past South Africa had a lease tax that was imposed to this end but which was scrapped in the 
new Minerals Act of1991. 
Funding the RDP and other government programmes requires collecting more tax. This can be 
done by raising tax rates or. preferably, increasing the tax base in the follOWing ways. First, by 
prOViding incentives that will stimulate the industry and bring new mines into production. 
Secondly, by encouraging the return ofmineral rights to the State. revenues from rentals for 
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access to these rights will be increased. Thirdly, by introducing a Minerals Rights Tax which 
would serve both to increase revenues to the fiscus. as well as encouraging exploration activity 
and the possihility ofnew mines. 
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 
With the exception ofgold mines, mines are subject to the same tax regime as other industries. 
Gold mines are not taxed on a flat rate, as are other mines, but are taxed by means on a tax 
formula. The tax formula for gold mines was first introduced in 1936 with a view to encouraging 
the mining ofmarginal ores at deeper levels by easing the tax burden on the less profitable mines 
in order to increase the profit to revenue ratios, and hence the return on investment. In domg 
this it introduced an element ofcross-subsidisation from the more profitable mines by increasing 
the State's share ofprofits from these mines. while reducing its share from the less profitable 
mines. 
The system o.fvariable taxation linked to profitability has allowed the gold mines to successfolly 
negotiate difficult periods and has given the state a reasonable share ofwinfall rent and 
dijforential rent. In this respect, the formula has been very successfol. It is desirable that the 
extension offormula tax to non-gold mines be investigated as a means for stimulating the 
industry as well as ensuring its long term survival andfor giving the state afair share ofmining 
rents. The taxation level must be reasonable both to promote international and domestic 
investments and to ensure that a proper share ofthe rent goes back to the State. 
Mines tend to be capital intensive with very long lead times. Thus the cost ofcapital is a crucial 
element in the viability ofnew projects and should continue to be ameliorated through the 
current system ofimmediate write-off in the first year ofoperation with the balance carried over 
to the next year, but the ejfoct ofinflation on the size ofthe write-offs needs to be taken into 
account. As mineral refining and beneficiation projects also have long lead times, this system 
should be extended to cover their capital expenditure. rather than the old system ofgiving 
immediate negotiable tax write-offs (37E) which could severely compromise thefiscus and the 
RDP. 
1. 	 Measures to enhance the optimal exploration and exploitation ofall mineral resources 
need to be devised. The current legislation neither defines what is meant by optimal 
mining, nor has sufficient powers to enforce optimal mining practices. Incentives and 
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disincentives need to be built into the tax and royalties regime to encourage optimal 
mining (at the lowest possible cut-off grades) and the optimal use ofSouth Africa's 
minerals (through beneficiation before exports). In this regard consideration should be 
given to the extension ofthe gold formula tax to other mining and the imposition ofa 
small royalty that decreased depending on the stage ofbeneficiation before export. 
POllCY 
1. 	 To consider a Mineral Rights Tax on privately held mineral rights that could be offset against 
any exploration expenditure. 
2. 	 To consider the imposition ofa small levy on all minerals extracted, based on the tonnage 
removed (depleted). Such levies should be low so as not to inordinantly raise the investment 
threshold and should be mineral specific. 
3. 	 To consider the application ofa small beneficiation related levy on all minerals exported, at a 
declining rate depending on the degree ofbenefiCiation (zero for the export ofmetals). 
4. 	 To consider the extension formula taxation all mining (not just gold and uranium). but with 
mineral specific formulas. 
5. 	 To reassess ring fenCing in order to encourage development ofotherwise uneconomic mineral 
deposits. However, the removal ofring foncing should be qual{fied and discretionary. 
6. 	 To consider the increase ofthe tax deductible capital at the rate ofinflation from the year of 
expenditure to the year ofwrite-off, to compensate for the effocts ofinflation on the cost of 
capital. 
7. 	 To extend the gold mining inflated capital write-off system to other mining as well as mineral 
benefiCiation projects (rather than a re-introduction of37E). 
8. 	 To expand the industry tax base by promoting minerals development through encouraging 
foreign and local investment in exploration and mining by introducing creative minerals tax 
incentives that could include greater than 100% write-offs and. possibly. flow-through share 
schemes. 
9. 	 The economic and social impact ofthe above poliCies should be investigated to ensure that 
the overall goals ofgrowing the industry's contribution to national well-being are achieved. 
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4.2.3 Draft Policv on Mineral Rights 
INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is amongst the worlds richest countries in terms ofmineral wealth. This wealth is a 
key national heritage and the property ofall South Africans. Current mineral rights laws have 
limited the optimal development ofmining and appropriate use ofurban land. It is the stated 
view ofthe ANC that private mineral rights should be returned to the democratic government, as 
;s the case in the rest ofthe world. including those countries which have successfol mining 
industries and in which small and large scale mining takes place side by side. Revision of 
mineral rights laws. and related statutes and institutional support mechanisms. must be done in 
foil consultation with all stakeholders. Prospectors, miners and investors must be confident that 
their risk finance will not be jeopardisedby changes in policy. and equally that the allocation 
and tenure ofmineral rights will be properly managed. 
ISSUES FOR CONSiDERATiON 
Aside from the USA. South Africa and a jew exceptions elsewhere for specific minerals. most 
countries assume public ownership ofminerals. The United Nations passed various resolutions 
on these issues in the 1960 's and most African States have adopted the approach of "Permanent 
Sovereignty" over their mineral resources. Importantly this does not prevent the allocation of 
secure title to mining rights to private parties. nor does it imply that rights cannot be tradable. it 
does however establish that the State can charge for access to the resource and that it has a 
legitimate interest in the manner ofits exploration and exploitation. 
The international trend over the last forty years has been towards public ownership ofmineral 
rights. This has variously been achieved through the introduction ofmineral rights taxes as well 
as several forms ofexpropriation. 
POLiCY 
1. 	 Security and continuity o/tenure/or mineral exploration and mining is essential to encourage 
high-risk exploration and to ensure that companies marshal large sums ofmoney to 
undertake mining. 
2. 	 Investors need to be assured ofthe right to proceed from exploration to mining prOVided pre­
defined criteria are met. 
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3. 	 Mining licenses must be ofsufficient duration to make exploration and development 
commitments worthwhile. 
4. 	 The practice o.ffreezing potential mineral wealth in areas 0.(privately owned mineral rights 
should be discouraged. The imposition ofa mineral rights tax, that would be deductible 
against any exploration expenditure, should be considered. Ifthe private owner ofmineral 
rights abandoned them to the state he/she should have first option on an exploration license 
over the same area, in exchange for submitting all past exploration data on the property. 
1. 	 Access to prospective mineral terrains is key to encouraging mineral exploration. This 
includes access to minerals beneath the surface (mineral rights) and to the surface to 
carry out exploration. In order to free up prospective mineral terrains for exploration a 
mineral rights tax should be considered that would be deductible against any 
exploration expenditure. 
5. 	 Where the state is the holder 0.(mineral rights, a system oflicenses or rights should be 
introduced consisting ofexploration and mining licenses with defined periods and work 
commitments, which will ensure a turnover ofexploration properties and encourage new 
investors. The minimum work requirements should be substantially less than the mineral 
rights tax to encourage the return ofprivately held rights to the public domain. 
6. 	 The power to grant mineral licenses should reside with one authority and not be subject to 




7. 	 To prevent monopolisation ofterritory it may be necessary to limit the number oflicenses that 
can be granted to anyone company or group ofrelated companies. 
8. 	 A suitable legal framework for small scale mining may be necessary. such as the creation of 
special mining zones with a high small scale mining potential. 
1. 	 The current mineral rights dispensation in South Africa will have to be changed ifsmall 
scale mining is to be promoted. The problem ofaccess to mineral rights could be 
addressed in the short term by direct negotiations with the current holders, and in the 
medium term by the introduction ofa system which will ensure that the mineral rights 
revert back to the state, such as a tax. 
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4.2.4 Draft Policy on Mineral Beneficiation and Domestic Raw 
Material Pricing 
INTRODUCTION 
Mining is a primary industry that exploits a national asset. part ofthe wealth ofpresent and 
fUture generations. Through adding value or beneficiating mineral resources a country can 
maximise the economic rent it derives from the asset. develop its economy and stimulate 
economic growth from its mineral sectors. The export ofun be neficiated ores is often sub-optimal 
use ofa wasting national asset. 
A considerable amount ofSouth Africa's .mineral resources are exported as raw ores or only 
partially processed South Africa has steadily improved its ratio ofbeneficiated to primary 
products exported since the 1970s. but these ratios are still well below the potential suggested by 
the quality and quantity ofits mineral resources. 
South Africa has the potential to raise the proportion ofmineral output that becomes 
beneficiated by virtue ofits large reserves, major transport advantage accruing to beneficiating 
close to the resource source, local skills base in engineering and related areas and most 
crucially, low energy costs. A number ofconstraints on fiLrlher beneficiation efforts do exist in 
the form ofthe large scale capital requirements needed by most projects. distance to final 
markets for much ofthe output from local plants, the high cost ofintermediate inputs and skills 
shortages in certain technical and managerial categories. The countries experience oflarge 
scale beneficiation projects has tended to be export oriented. While this has had a positive 
impact on export earnings, down stream value addingfabrication industries have been neglected 
Beneficiation involves processing a natural resource to transform it into a higher value product, 
usually an intermediate product used as an input by fabricators. Fabrication involves the 
production offinal goods by transforming intermediate inputs. i.e. beneficiators supply inputs to 
fabricators to make final goods. 
POLICIES TO PROMOTE BENEFICIATION 
1. 	 The local fabricator should, as far as possible. not be disadvantaged through o/tgopolistic 
pricing ofinputs and South Africa's distance from alternative suppliers. They should charged 
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the export parity price or profit parity price (profit parity between export and domestic 
markets) or. even cost plus reasonable return. Beneficiation projects should be required to 
provide pricing structures that will at best favour the local fabricator. or are at least neutral 
with regard to export price structures. to qualifY/or capital expenditure write-off schemes or 
any other state incentives or support. 
2. 	 Qualificationfor tax concessions andfinancefor benefiCiation projects should require 
advantageous domestic pricing such as export parity prices for local fabricators. 
3. 	 A small levy. payable on unheneficiated ores which are exported. could be considered to 
encourage their local benefiCiation. The levy levels could reduce depending on the level of 
benefiCiation. 
4. 	 Tax breaks are often necessary to make large benefiCiation projects viable due to the long 
lead times to earnings in the context afhigh inflation. Features ofthe current tax regime 
applicable to capital expenditure for gold mines in which capex tax credits may be brought 
forward in their entirety with a consideration for annual inflation. should be extended to 
cover mineral benefiCiation projects. but carriedforward at actual inflation rather than an 
arbitrary consideration. The application ofthese provisions to cover all ex-mine value adding 
processes that terminate with the production 0/dimensional products should be investigated. 
5. 	 The state through the Department ofTrade and Industry and development finance institutions, 
in particular the Industrial Development Corporation, should give emphasis to supporting 
downstream industries able to exploit the opportunities created by the availability of 
competitively priced inputs from benefiCiation projects. 
6. 	 The state through the Department ofFinance and the Reserve Bank should take steps to lower 
economic andfiscal uncertainty and permit long term planning to be undertaken, cruCial/or 
projects 0/the magnitude ofmineral beneficiation projects. By lowering the risks involved in 
launching benefiCiation projects the returns required by providers ofcapital are lowered and 
the financing costs correspondingly reduced. 
'::';,".. 
4.3 Analysis of proposed policy 
Before beginning the analysis of the proposed policy it is worth noting that although there is 
extensive mention ofoptimality and sustainability in the ANC's discussion document, there is no 
attempt to define what is meant by these terms. To avoid this limitation, this chapter will use the 
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Hartwick definition of sustainable utilisation of non-renewable resources, and will use the 
benchmark case described in chapter two as the definition for optimal extraction. 
There is a proposal at the end of the discussion document that fiscal and monetary policy be used 
to lower uncertainty and to encourage long term planning. Such risk reduction would mean lower 
required rates of return and lower financing costs. While these policies would have a positive effect 
on the mining industry, resulting in a move towards optimality in extraction and investment, they 
are general macroeconomic policies which should be a goal of any government at all times, and not 
be seen as existing for the benefit of one sector. 
4.3.1 Environmental policv 
The ANC environmental policy as it pertains to minerals concentrates on five basic themes; 
pollution and the rehabilitation of mine land, the role of small-scale miners, conununity 
consultation, water management, and the policy making process. Of these the theme that receives 
the most attention is pollution and the rehabilitation of mine land, this is also the area of policy that 
is most likely to have the greatest impact on mining. 
The ANC has proposed that the benefits from mining be balanced against all the costs that result 
from extracting a body of ore, including those of pollution and rehabilitation. This means that there 
is move towards recognising that environmental degradation due to mining represents a cost to 
society that must be internalised into the mining decision. The gap between marginal private and 
marginal social costs must be closed in order that the extraction of minerals be truly socially 
optimal. With the internalisation of externalities, the private costs ofextraction will be raised, 
raising the grade of the lowest payable ore quality, which in turn means less ore extracted and the 
life of the mine shortened. Despite the fact that this result is contrary to the stated ANC goals, it is 
a move towards extraction optimality as defined above. 
The proposed changes to the rehabilitation fund will tum the required payments into the equivalent 
of a severence tax33• The same may be said of the proposed levy to pay for past damage and cases 
where the damaging party cannot be identified. 
33 The effects of a severence tax as described by Heaps (1985) are described in chapter two of this paper. 
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The proposed streamlining ofthe policy making process as well as the desire to comply with 
international nonns should help to reduce uncertainty in the minerals industry and reduce 
bureaucratic costs. These effects should serve to make investment in the minerals industry more 
attractive and efficient, possibly culminating in more mines coming into production. Additionally, 
with the adoption of international environmental standards, the South African minerals industry 
would not need to fear the imposition of punitive tariffs on its exports by countries which demand 
higher environmental standards from their own mining industries34 . 
With respect to small scale miners, the proposed environmental education policy would reduce the 
number of small scale miners meeting the requirements for a mining licence by effectively raising 
its price. The proposal for increased state management in areas where small scale mining is 
concentrated may help to lower the costs faced by such miners if one takes an optimistic view of 
state involvement. 
In all, the proposed environmental policy for the minerals industry will have at least two effects: 
1) to raise costs as externalities are internalised to the mining industry, and 

2) to reduce uncertainty as policy changes become more transparent and fewer departments have 

overlapping or contradictory legislation. 

Both these effects should help to promote the optimal extraction of the nation's resources. 

The increased investment due to the lowered uncertainty, and the increased exploration due to the 

decline in payable reserves35 (due to raised extraction costs) should help to offset any negative 





34 This sort of punitive tariff is increasingly being used to circumvent GATT requirements. 
35 The rise in costs due to the internalising of environmental costs results in the mines having to raise the 
average grade of ore they mine in order to maintain a constant return on capital. This means a rise in the 
lowest payable grade of ore. (The formula tax would counter this effect ifextended to all mines.) This may 
imply a large reduction in payable reserves as there are often larger reserves of lower grade ore than of 
higher grade ore. A major decline in payable reserves gives an incentive to invest in exploration in order 
to raise the stock of payable reserves. 
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4.3.2 Mineral tax policv 
The AN C has proposed a number of changes to minerals taxation, of these the most important are 
probably the proposed minerals rights tax, the extension of formula taxation to all minerals and the 
extension of the capital allowance and redemption systems to all mining and beneficiation projects. 
These proposed changes will be the focus ofthis section. 
Other proposals are the small levy on tonnage depleted (a severence tax), the beneficiation levy and 
the reassessment of ring-fencing. The last ofthese could be seen as an element of the proposal to 
extend the capital redemption and capital allowance systems, as can be the proposal of the 
possibility of greater than 100% write-offs to attract investment to the mining sector. 
The ANC document offers no indication as to the purpose of the levy on tonnage depleted, although 
it may be related to the proposed environmental protection levy discussed above. The depletion levy 
is a severence tax which will raise the lowest payable grade ofore that will be mined. The result of 
such a tax, as indicated by Heaps (1984)36, is that less ore is extracted and as a result the life of the 
mine is shortened. If the lifespans of the mines are adversely affected, one would expect a negative 
impact on employment in the mines. If the levy is, however, aimed at forcing the intemalisation of 
externalities it would be encouraging mines to extract ore in a socially optimal manner despite the 
negative effects. The revenue generated by the levy would then be compensation for the 
environmental resources used during the extraction process, not for the ore extracted, and could 
thus not be considered as part of the rents generated by the mining process. 
The beneficiation levy would be charged on unbeneficiated ore exported, the size of the levy 
declining as the level of beneficiation of the exported mineral increases. This levy is essentially the 
same as that on the export of uncut diamonds and is ostensibly meant to encourage domestic 
beneficiation. The success of the ANC's policy in this regard will depend on far more than just this 
levy. These other factors will be addressed in the section on beneficiation and domestic input 
pricing policy below. Any beneficiation project that is initiated will take some time to come on 
stream, and domestic exporters of unbeneficiated ore will be disadvantaged by the levy until the 
domestic beneficiation capacity increases. The levy will cut into domestic producers' profits as 
36 See chapter two. 
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they are generally price takers. The levy thus has the same effect as a cost increase. It is in effect a 
severence tax which will serve to raise the grade of the lowest payable ore, shortening the life span 
of the mines it affects and negatively affecting employment. This effect will remain as long as some 
part of the ore extracted is exported in unbeneficiated fonn 
At a macroeconomic and welfare level it is possible that these losses will be outweighed by the 
increased employment in beneficiation industries and the wealth these industries will bring to the 
country by increasing the level ofdomestic value added. From a revenue perspective, the levy will 
generate positive net revenues for as long as local ore production greatly exceeds local 
beneficiation capacity. It is possible that as long run revenues from the levy decline due to higher 
levels oflocal beneficiation, these revenue losses will be offset by the broadening of the tax base. 
The proposed extension of the capital allowance and capital redemption systems to all mines and 
beneficiation projects, and the proposal that the capital allowance be increased by pennitting the 
value of tax deductible capital to increase at the rate of inflation, affect the extraction rate directly 
and indirectly. They affect the extraction profile of individual mines by influencing the capacity 
constraint that physical capital imposes on the mines. Since capital is not free, the mine owner 
invests in capital until the change in the present value of the mine as a marginal unit of capital is 
added to the mine equals the cost ofadding that unit. The level of capital invested in the mine thus 
determines the maximum amount that can be extracted from the mine at any point in time. Consider 










A mine unconstrained by capital costs (as posited by Hotelling) would invest enough to begin 
extraction at q(O), and follow the unconstrained extraction path to terminal time T'. A mine 
constrained by capital costs, however, would invest only until the optimal condition for investment 
described above is met. In general, this will not be enough to extract q(O) in the first period. (Why 
have excess capacity for the rest of the mine's life?) If only enough capital to extract initial amount 
q" is invested, then the mine follows the constrained extraction path to terminal time T. Assuming 
the same total amount is extracted, T is greater than T', and t" the time at which the constrained 
mine stops operating at capacity can also be shown to be greater than T'. Hartwick and Olewiier, 
(1986). The constrained path can then be seen as the optimal path in the light of capital costs. If the 
cost of capital in the mining industry is reduced, the capacity of the mine would be increased as the 
capital constraint is eased. The extraction path resulting is shown below: 
q(t} 
q(O) Constrained mine 





t(O) T' T t 
The extraction rate is raised as the capital constraint is eased, and the terminal time is drawn 
forward. Thus if all other conditions remain unchanged, the capital allowance and redemption 
systems speed up extraction in individual mines and shorten their lifespans. 
These proposals further influence extraction patterns indirectly by lowering the cost of capital in 
the mining sector, and lowering the risks involved in investing in mining and beneficiation, i.e. by 
affecting the rates of entry and exit into the industry. It achieves this by reducing the time it takes 
to recoup capital expenditure. It encourages investment as investors know the income generated by 
their capital will only be taxed after the initial outlay has been recouped. However, by lowering the 
cost of capital in one sector, government distorts the investment patterns of the economy as a 
whole. Investment funds are attracted to the minerals industry at the expense ofother sectors of the 
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economy. The artificial attraction of the sector results in the inefficient allocation of factors of 
production. The end result is excessive investment in the minerals sector, to the detriment of the 
economy as a whole. As the cost of capital in the minerals sector declines and the level of 
investment increases, so the national rate of extraction of ore increases. As is argued in the chapter 
above, this lowering of the cost of capital places a wedge between the rate of interest the mines use 
for their extraction decisions and that used for their investment decisions. There is thus no 
balancing effect as described in appendix A to prevent a private rate of discount higher than the 
social rate leading to excessively high extraction rates. In effect the divergence between private and 
social rates ofdiscount is aggravated and a gap opens between the actual and socially optimal rates 
of extraction. 
As more mines are brought into production (the cost of entry is reduced) and extraction rates at 
every individual mine increases, the mineral resources of the nation are depleted more rapidly than 
is socially optimal. In the short run of course the employment level will be raised as mining activity 
increases, but this will last only as long as the mines are producing. This will not be a problem if 
the state favours current over future employment. 
More rapid extraction also means more environmental degradation in a shorter time, while 
increased levels of local beneficiation imply increased levels of local pollution. 
An increase in the capital allowance and the extension ofcapital redemption and capital allowance 
to all mines and beneficiation projects will mean a decrease in tax revenues in the short run, until 
new investment broadens the tax base. This was the fear which was realised in the early eighties 
and resulted in the introduction of the ring-fencing system. This prevented mines writing off capital 
expenditure in the first year of production against income generated by other mines in the group. 
As a result, the cost of capital was effectively raised to some extent, adversely affecting the mining 
houses' returns, but protecting part of the government's tax revenues. 
The proposed mineral rights tax is aimed at encouraging the return of mineral rights to the public 
domain in order that the state may extract a rent or royalty from the mining companies who wish to 
mine a resource. It is also aimed at freeing up mineral rights which are not in use so that others 
may be given the opportunity of utilising these resources. It further proposes that exploration 
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expenditure be deductible against the tax. This is intended to encourage the holders of mineral 
rights to use them. Where the rights are not being used, it should be worthwhile for the owners to 
relinquish them to the state, helping to free up rights for new investors and small scale mining 
ventures. Where the rights are being used, and there is no new exploration being undertaken, such a 
tax will simply raise the marginal tax rates faced by mines. making further investment less 
attractive and cutting into profit margins. Lower profits means a raised lowest payable grade, and a 
shorter life span for the mine, i.e. there is a direct influence on the extraction profile. Heaps (1984) 
Revenue is not the primary goal of the proposed mineral rights tax, and it is unlikely that much will 
be generated as it achieves its primary goals of increasing exploration and returning mineral rights 
to the state. The return oftbese mineral rights to the public domain will create the potential for 
future revenues to be generated from lease payments by those wishing to use them. 
The formula tax system creates distortions in the mining process encouraging the non-optimal use 
of resources, thereby driving a wedge between the private and social benefits of mining. The effects 
of the formula in the gold mining industry have been described in some detail in the previous 
chapter and will be formalised in appendix D. Extending it to other minerals will increase the waste 
of resources by inducing the mining of sub-marginal ore grades. The result will be a fall in 
revenues accruing to the fisc as rents are sacrificed through the mining of lower grade ore, and the 
compromising of sustainability and intergenerational equity as less rent remains available to be 
invested in renewable capitaL It is ironic that the aim of the authorities introducing the formula tax 
was to lengthen the lifespan of the mines in order to promote sustainability and equity! 
As lower grade ore is mined there is more waste per unit of final output, meaning a greater 
environmental toll for less benefits. The volume ofore that is extracted and processed in order to 
extract a unit of pure mineral is greater the lower the grade of the ore. The amount of waste 
remaining after processing is greater, and the benefits generated from it are less. Thus, the net 
social benefits from mining a unit of lower grade ore are less than from a unit of high grade ore, 
and may even be negative. 
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4.3.3 Mineral rights policy 
The ANC's mineral rights policy centres on security of tenure, the return of mineral rights to the 
state, the encouragement of use ofmineral rights and the freeing up ofmineral rights in order to 
encourage the competitive use of the nation's mineral resources. 
South Africa finds itself in a position where the major mining houses hold large amounts of unused 
mineral rights, making it difficult for new entrants to the sector to obtain exploration and mining 
rights. (The situation has been likened to a cow in a lush green pasture that stretches its neck out 
over the fence to eat the growth it does not own wIlile saving that which it does. Kruger and de Wit 
(1987» There are indications that South Africa, unlike other African states, is missing out on a 
mining exploration boom in Africa because of, amongst other factors, the unavailability of mineral 
rights. Ryan (1995). The ANC feels that this problem is due to the mining houses sitting on 
mineral rights which could be exploited by other companies, and needs to be addressed quite 
urgently. It is hoped that the proposed mineral rights tax will achieve this. 
The mineral rights tax should free-up unused mineral rights, and encourage exploration activity if 
exploration expenditure can be deducted from the tax. It should also encourage competition in the 
industry as new large investors as well as small scale miners can obtain mineral rights. This may 
negate the need for any anti-trust legislation in the mining sector. 
If the tax were levied on rights currently in use, it would simply raise the marginal tax rate on mine 
income. This would make the South African nlinerals sector less attractive to investors, who would 
invest elsewhere. 
In the introduction, mention was made of the single land tax and its sinlliarity to the expropriation 
of land by the state which would then let it to tenants for an amount equal to its econonllc rent, 
allowing a reasonable return on investment and the recovery of interest and requiring payment of 
the excess. This is essentially what the ANC proposes in the case of the mines. If the state held the 
rights to all minerals, it could let these in return for the mineral rents to those who wish to mine. 
The parties who invested in the mining operation would be allowed to recover their capital and a 
reasonable return on it, and any excess revenue would be paid to the state. In this situation however 
any other tax on mine income would reduce the return on capital that was deemed to be 
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'reasonable'. There is a problem with determining the return to various factors of production, 
especially capital and entrepreneurial risk. This is especially true in the extractive industries where 
there are high levels of risk and the return on capital including the risk premium must be separated 
from the economic rent. It would thus be difficult to determine what a 'reasonable' return should 
be. 
As long as the state has the right to ta'X it has the ability to extract the rents generated by mining, 
without itself owning the mineral rights. Hence it is not clear that it is necessary for the state to 
hold the mineral rights in order to extract rents. The extraction of rent is thus no reason for the 
state to require the return of mineral rights to the public domain. 
Beyond the need to capture rents, the ANC appears to believe that the return of mineral rights to 
the state is necessary to encourage the use of mineral rights and the competitive use of the nation's 
mineral resources. While private ownership of mineral rights is not common amongst other mineral 
rich nations, it is not clear that private ownership in itself prevents the optimal exercise of such 
rights. The mineral rights tax should induce a market in mineral rights, where unused rights can be 
sold, or leased to those willing to utilise them. 
An advantage of having mineral rights privately held is that the state does not need to be concerned 
with guaranteeing security of tenure; an issue which the remainder of the mineral rights policy 
attempts to address. 
Although it is doubtful that the mineral rights tax will induce the holders of such rights to return 
them to the state (they could just as easily avoid the tax by selling unused rights to parties willing 
to use them), the state still has to ensure security oftenure for those wishing to mine where it holds 
the mineral rights. The recommended policy ofguaranteeing tenure for as long as is necessary to 
ensure optimal use of the mineral resource is a positive one, as are the other proposals pertaining to 
the allocation of licences. These policies should help to reduce the levels of uncertainty faced by 
potential investors, and speed up the process ofgranting of licences (as fewer departments would 
be involved). Both of these effects should encourage investment and optimal extraction, as well as 
aiding in the employment creation process. Care must be taken, however, to avoid companies 
merely making the minimum use ofthe rights necessary to secure these for future usage. 
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The mineral rights policy proposed by the ANC appears to be sound and to encourage optimal 
investment in mining and extraction of minerals. The only doubt attaches to the return of mineral 
rights to the state, which need not be a prerequisite for attaining the other positive goals set out in 
the policy statement. Besides this one exception, the policy should successfully reduce government 
induced uncertainty and market induced monopoly ofownership of rights, resulting in a move 
towards more optimal investment patterns and extraction paths. 
4.3.4 Beneficiation and domestic raw materials pricing policy 
Beneficiation and pricing policy centre on the beneficiation levy, the extension of the capital 
allowance and capital redemption, and 'fair' domestic pricing strategies. The first two were 
discussed in the section on mineral taxation, this section will focus primarily on the last mentioned. 
The ANC's pricing policy states that local fabricators are not to be disadvantaged by oligopolistic 
domestic pricing of inputs and distance from alternative suppliers. They should be charged export 
parity price or profit parity price (profit parity between export and domestic markets) or even cost 
plus reasonable return. These policies, although vague, appear to be aimed at preventing domestic 
mines from charging domestic fabricators the f.o.b. price plus transport costs. One way to achieve 
this, according to the discussion document, would be to require suppliers to provide pricing 
structures that best favour local fabricators in order to qualify for the capital allowance and 
redemption schemes. 
This policy is unlikely to have any significant effect on local extraction patterns as the reduction in 
extra profits due to charging transport fees should be minor. It will, however, provide support for 
domestic industry and employment. It will thus augment the proposals for support for downstream 
industries capable of taking advantage of competitively priced inputs. 
An issue that is not addressed in the discussion document is that of comparative advantage. This 
issue is especially relevant to the beneficiation levy. It may be that in some sectors ofthe South 
African minerals industry there is no comparative advantage in beneficiation. This may be due to a 
shortage of the factors of production used in the beneficiation process, or simply because the levels 
of productivity possible in this country are below those ofcompeting nations. In these situations, 
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both the levy and increased domestic beneficiation would be harmful to our international 
competitiveness. 
4.4 Description of conflicts in policy and objectives 
There are a number of conflicting policy objectives set out in the discussion document which will 
need to be resolved before any final policy is legislated. The most obvious ofthese conflicts in 
goals is the desire to encourage optimality ofextraction, efficiency, sustainability and the mining of 
the lowest possible ore grade. To encourage the last of these is to compromise the first three. They 
cannot be attained simultaneously. The reasons for this are explained in the sections above which 
discuss the formula tax system. To reiterate, by encouraging the mines to extract a grade of ore 
which is not worth the cost of extraction, by subsidising the loss out of rents, the state is 
encouraging the waste of resources today out of funds meant to compensate future generations for 
the extraction of ore. This includes generations that come after the mines have closed, no matter 
how long that date is postponed by the tax. 
This means there is also conflict between the revenue objectives of the state and the formula tax 
system. There is a need for revenue to finance the RDP, and the ANC has expressed a desire to 
increase state revenues from mining operations. This is in conflict with the formula tax system, 
which subsidises the waste of resources out of potential tax revenues as described in appendix D. 
There is a link between revenues and sustainable development (as defined by Hartwick, (977) in 
the form of the RDP. The RDP is aimed at the financing of housing, infrastructure and human 
capital~ types of investment that sustainability demands. It is therefore inconsistent that rents from 
the mineral industry are spent on current employment and wasted resources. 
The encouragement of the extraction of lower grades ofore is in conflict with the environmental 
concerns expressed by the ANC. The environmental policy is likely to encourage an increase in the 
lowest payable grade by bringing private costs into line with social costs, while the formula tax 
system used to encourage the extraction of low grade ore places a wedge between them. 
The capital allowance and capital redemption systems are partially in conflict with revenue 
objectives. Only partially because the capital allowance and redemption systems encourage 
investment, and thus broaden the tax base. The ANC's policy on ring fencing does indicate some 
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1 
concern about revenue in the short run, with a cautious attitude being taken towards the removal of 
the fences. 
The policy which is most at odds with the ANC's objectives is that of encouraging the extraction of 
sub-marginal ore grades via the formula tax system. The policy suggestion that this system be 
extended to all mines is in conflict with the environmental goals, the goals of sustainability and 
optimality, the revenue needs of the state, as well as the efficiency goals towards which the ANC 




South Africa has entered a transitional phase and the minerals sector has not escaped the attention 
of those bringing about the changes. South Africa is a mineral wealthy nation and the people ofthe 
nation should benefit from this wealth. It is the ANC's stated intention to maximise the mineral 
industry's contribution to the reconstruction and development of the nation. It has been the 
intention of this paper to analyse the policies proposed to achieve this goal and decide whether or 
not they will be effective. 
5.1 Summary of Results 
The ANC's proposals as they pertain to the minerals industry have been presented and analysed in 
the preceding chapter. A summary of the conclusions arrived at are presented below. 
1. The environmental policy consists of methods of reducing externalities by forcing the 
internalisation of all production costs, and of reducing uncertainty due to policy conflicts or lack 
of clarity. The objectives are sound and the proposed policies should be effective in attaining 
them. The effects on the mineral industry are twofold. 
Firstly the raised costs as externalities are internalised will reduce the lifespans of the mines as 
unit costs of extraction are raised (the same effect as a severence tax). They will also lower the 
expected returns on new mines, thus reducing investment in exploration and the development of 
new nunes. 
Secondly, the reduced uncertainty from clearer policies should reduce costs associated with risk 
(such as financing costs) and encourage investment. 
Whether the effects on extraction of these two policies cancel each other out will depend on a 
number of factors and is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the net effect will be 
beneficial to the environment and the economy as externalities are reduced and there is a move 
towards greater optimality (due to a reduction in externally imposed uncertainty and the closing 
of the gap between private and social costs) in the minerals sector. 
2. The mineral rights policy is aimed at freeing-up mineral rights, assuring security of tenure and 
returning mineral rights to the public domain in order to extract economic rents and encourage 
the use of the mineral rights. The policy instrument suggested to achieve the first and the last of 
59 
these is the mineral rights tax. The mineral rights tax should be effective in achieving the first 
objective, i.e. the freeing-up of rights, but it is not clear that it will achieve the second. It has 
been argued in this paper that it is not necessary that the objective of returning mineral rights to 
the public domain be achieved, as all the perceived benefits of state ownership can be obtained 
under private ownership, without encountering the security of tenure problems of state control. 
The mineral rights tax on deposits currently being exploited will raise the average tax rate faced 
by mines. This will reduce expected returns from mining and discourage investment in 
exploration and the development ofnew mines. Where it is charged on unused claims, it will 
encourage the owners to either use the claim, let or sell it to somebody else who wishes to use it, 
or abandon the rights to the state. 
The aim of the mineral rights tax should thus be the creation of a market in mineral rights, 
which will free up rights and encourage exploration and investment. If it succeeds in this goal, 
it will encourage a greater level of competition and activity in the domestic minerals market. 
More competition would help achieve the goal of optimal extraction, while more activity will 
lead to more employment in the minerals sector. The tax would also generate revenue in the 
short run while helping broaden the tax base in the long run. 
With respect to security of tenure on state land, the proposed policies should encourage optimal 
extraction and investment process, by reducing risks associated with security of tenure and 
encouraging competition, while simultaneously aiding the employment creation. This should be 
the result as long as any freezing of rights by companies (by engaging in minimum usage of 
rights granted to them) is avoided. 
3. Beneficiation and domestic input pricing policy is aimed at encouraging greater levels of 
domestic beneficiation and fabrication. The policy instruments proposed to achieve these goals 
are a beneficiation levy on exports of ore, the extension of the capital allowance and capital 
redemption systems to beneficiation projects, and the withdrawal of tax incentives from 
companies which price their output in a manner which penalises local fabricators. 
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The above policy instruments (with the exception of the levy) should not have any effect on the 
mining industry. The levy, however, will reduce the profits of domestic producers of ore as they 
are generally price takers and unable to shift the levy onto foreign beneficiators. The levy 
becomes a severence tax which shortens the lifespan of mines and negatively affects 
employment. In addition, as long as some ore is exported unbeneficiated, the expected returns 
from mining are reduced, reducing the incentive to invest in the mining sector. These negative 
effects may be more than offset by the gains from increased domestic beneficiation. 
There is, however, no certainty that the levy would encourage increased domestic beneficiation 
as there are a number of other factors to be considered. The most important of these is 
comparative advantage. Before encouraging investment in beneficiation projects by reducing the 
cost of capital and imposing levies, it must be asked whether domestic beneficiation is viable. 
The beneficiation process may require inputs that need to be imported, or factors of production 
that are not as productive in South Africa as elsewhere. In this situation it may be detrimental to 
the economy to initiate a project which would be uncompetitive in international terms. 
With respect to pricing policy, it may be worth considering policies which will encourage 
competitiveness in the domestic minerals markets in order to achieve the pricing goals. The 
mineral rights tax would be one such policy. 
4. The remainder of the minerals policy proposed by the ANe focuses on the lowering of capital 
costs to encourage investment in mining, and on the encouragement of low grade mining in order 
to increase the lifespans of the mines and increase employment levels. The proposed policy 
instruments to attain these goals are, 
a) the extension of the capital allowance and capital redemption systems to all mines, and 
b) the extension of the formula tax system to all mines. 
The extension of the capital allowance and capital redemption systems could have serious 
consequences for government revenue, ore extraction paths and lifespans of individual mines, 
investment patterns, employment, and the lifespan of the nation's mineral resources. 
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Looking at the first of these: by allowing the capital expenditure on a mine to be written off 
against income in a single year (or any shortened period), the state is sacrificing revenue. Even 
if these revenue losses are acceptable to the state in order to increase the level of investment in 
the mining industry, there are the problems associated \vith the increased investment. 
The lowering of the cost of capital in one sector of the economy, ceteris paribus, creates 
distortions as capital is drawn to that sector at the expense of others. The increased levels of 
investment are not limited to new ventures. but also serve to reduce the capacity constraints 
imposed on existing mines. This speeds up extraction and. assuming all else constant, shortens 
the life of the mine. Employment on any mine increases, but the duration of that employment is 
shortened. Levels of emplo~ment are similarly increased in the short run by increased 
investment in new ventures. Again this is short term as the life of the state' s mineral resource as 
a whole is shortened by the combined effect of more mines and faster extraction in each mine. A 
higher level of environmental degradation would also be associated with this faster extraction. 
Looking at the question of sustainability, the attraction ofcapital to the mining sector at the 
expense of other sectors of the economy means that more capital is invested in forms of capital 
which have no residual value once the ore reserves have been exhausted, such as sinking shafts 
(a sunk cost ifyou like), and less in renewable capital. Future generations thus inherit less 
renewable capital, and more holes in the ground. 
The extension of the formula tax system to all mines would have similar results. The formula 
tax system encourages the mines to waste resources in order to mine low grade ore, or to mine 
deeper lying ore, thus lengthening the life of the mines and maintaining employment. The wasted 
resources are in effect wasted rents. The state is thus sacrificing rents (revenue) in order to lift 
employment levels and standards of living today. In terms of sustainability and intergenerational 
equity, this amounts to theft. Not only do future generations (those generations that come after 
the mines have closed) have less are in the ground, but the compensation they should have 
received in the form of renewable capital for the removed are is reduced. 
Proponents of the formula tax and the encouragement of low grade are extraction will argue that 
the waste of resources and the sacrifice of rents is justified by the objectives of maximising 
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lifespans and increasing employment. They may argue that by mining ore which would 
otherwise not be extracted the benefits from the mine are ma.ximised. The rebuttal is easy, the 
optimal extraction of ore as described in the benchmark case in chapter two maximises the 
benefits to be obtained from mining. This was the result that Hotelling proved in 1931. The 
benefits cannot be increased by sacrificing rents in order to mine uneconomic ore reserves. 
The employment creation argument shows that the formula tax is, in effect, a public works 
program, with the government subsidising the digging ditches worth less than they cost. The 
RDP and sustainability (as defined by Hartwick in 1977) would be better served if the rents 
from the mines were used on public works programs aimed at improving infrastructure, building 
roads and laying water and sanitation systems, rather than digging deeper mines. 
There are also the added environmental costs associated with lower grades of ore being mined, 
there is more waste for less output. In the case ofgold mines this has meant cyanide slimes 
dams, arsenical waste and dumps. 
In view of the costs associated with the formula tax, the proposal to extend it to all mines must 
be reconsidered. Revenue, environmental, sustainability and optimality goals would be better 
served if it were not eA1ended, and perhaps even removed from the gold mines. 
To sum up then, the environmental policy is sound and the instruments proposed should achieve the 
goals set, while simultaneously encouraging optimality. The mineral rights policy, with the 
exception of the goal of returning rights to the public domain, is also sound and should encourage 
optimality in investment and extraction. The beneficiation and pricing policy need to be re­
examined, as the latter can be achieved with other policies and the former may bear more costs 
than benefits. The proposed extension of the capital allowance, capital redemption and formula tax 
systems to all mines would increase existing distortions in extraction rates, further compromise 
sustainability and environmental policy, and would reduce revenues to the fisc. 
In view of the distortions created by the formula tax, the capital allowance and the capital 
redemption facility, as well as the conflict between these instruments and other policy objectives, it 
is recommended that they not be extended to other mines. It is also recommended that their 
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application to the gold and platinum mines be reconsidered in favour of a neutraL flat rate profits 
ta'(. 
5.2 Conclusions 
Amongst the tasks facing the ANC and Government of National Unity is that of extracting the 
maximum amount of economic rent from the mining sector while operating within a series of 
constraints. These constraints include competition for international investment capital, pressure 
from domestic mine labour unions, environmental concerns, optimality and efficiency concerns, as 
well as desires for equity and redistribution. 
Pressure from the unions will be brought to bear on the GNU to ma'<.im.ise the current benefits to 
members by improving working conditions and wage rates. As such, the unions are likely to place 
more emphasis on current rather than future employment. Union support for the extension of the 
formula tax to all mines would thus be consistent with their goals as it induces the transfer of a 
portion of the economic rents to current labour. It would also be consistent for the unions to favour 
the extension of the capital allowance and redemption systems as these will shift the labour demand 
to the right, raising employment levels and/or wage rates. It is unlikely that labour will be in favour 
of any policy (such as the environmental policy) which will reduce the mines' lifespans and lead to 
a reduction in employment or wages in the short tenn. 
The environmental lobby will be pressing the state to introduce policies which favour the 
environment despite opposition from organised labour. The green movement is an international 
one, and cannot be ignored. There is a possibility of punitive trade tariffs being introduced against 
any country which does not meet international environmental protection standards. It would be 
consistent for environmentalists to pressure government for the removal of the fonnula tax and 
reconsideration of the capital allowance and redemption policies in light of the detrimental effects 
these have on the environment. 
Beyond the lobbying of these two opposing groups, the state must consider optimality, efficiency, 
equity and redistribution. Fundamentally, this is the growth vs. redistribution argument with a 
twist. In the case of growth generated by the extension of the fonnula ta'(, the capital allowance 
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and the capital redemption facility, growth does not result from efficiency and optimality. Rather, it 
results from a redistribution of benefits from future generations to current ones. Equity and 
redistribution between generations as well as within generations is best served by optimality of 
extraction. The fonnula tax, the capital allowance or the capital redemption systems are not 
consistent with these goals. 
International competition for investment capital constrains the amount of rent that can be extracted 
by taxation (or any other means) rather than the means of rent extraction. While an increase in the 
average rate of taxation faced by an existing mine will not alter its extraction profile (as long as the 
tax is neutral), it will reduce expected returns from new investment and thus reduce the incentive to 
invest. In an international context, if South Africa wishes to remain competitive in the market for 
new investment capital, average tax rates cannot be raised much higher than those faced by capital 
invested in mining elsewhere in the world. 
The constraining factors described above will detennine which policies are implemented and which 
are not, which will in turn determine South Africa's international competitiveness and levels of 
social welfare, present and future. The fonnula tax, the capital allowance and the capital 
redemption policies are not consistent with the objectives ofgovernment. Even labour is hanned by 
these policies in the long run. All parties will lose in the long run if they are implemented, leading 




There is some uncertainty surrounding the effects of a divergence between the private or market 

discount rate and the social rate. It has been suggested by conservationists that private rates of 

discount are generally higher than the social rate. and that this results in greater than optimal 

extraction rates. Their argument is that with a higher interest rate or discount rate, the resource 

O'Mler faces a higher opportunity cost when leaving ore in the ground. The higher the private rate 

of discount the greater the present value of the resource once extracted, sold and converted into an 

interest bearing asset. Hence the owner's incentive to speed up extraction. 

This argument would be robust, but for the relationship between interest and investment, and the 

observation that higher extraction rates require more capital equipment, and thus more investment. 

(Additionally, the marginal cost of production tends to rise as extraction rates increase, which 

would have a dampening effect on the incentive to increase the extraction rate.) Mining, especially 

at deep levels, is capital intensive, from the exploration stage right through to final production. 

Before an increase in investment in such a project is undertaken, the project must be expected to 

offer an internal rate of return equal to or greater than the market interest rate. Thus, as interest 

rates rise, it becomes more difficult for new investment in a given project to satisfy the criteria 

necessary for viability. I.e. in mining, as elsewhere, the marginal efficiency of investment and 

marginal efficiency of capital schedules are negatively sloped. 

If the private discount rate is in fact higher than the social discount rate, then the effects are: 

I) to reduce the amount invested in mining, but 

2) to speed up extraction at developed sites with existing capital. 

Obviously the effect of less investment in mining is that fewer mines will be developed. There are 

thus fewer mines than there would be if the social discount rate were used, extracting faster than 

would be the case if the social rate were used. The net effect then is ambiguous, and depends on 

the elasticity of the investment schedule. 

If the effect of lower investment in exploration and new mines outweighs the higher extraction 







As indicated by the tables in appendix C, South Africa has large reserves of many minerals. and in 
some cases (such as platinum) dominates the world's mineral reserves. This puts South Africa in 
the unique position that as a nation it has the ability to exert some monopoly power in certain of the 
\vorld's minerals markets. It may even be argued that it would be in the nation's best interests to 
encourage the exertion of what monopoly power we have in order to maximise the rents obtainable 
from the nation's resources. With the exception of he diamond market, this power is not exerted, as 
a result of competition between mines domestically. 
There is of course the counter-argument that such power cannot be guaranteed in the long run, and 
that the incentive to engage in minerals exploration overseas provided by such monopoly prices 
may result in discoveries that undennine the profitability of our O\\<TI mines, resulting in a net 
reduction in rents accrued. This was the fate of Jamaican bauxite, although the circumstances were 
slightly different in that situation (the foreign exploration was prompted by lower profits due to 
increased rent payments to the state, not due to monopoly extraction rates). 
While the ownership of mines in South Africa is relatively diluted, control is highly concentrated. 
This is due to the system of corporate governance in South Africa \vhereby the founder of a 
company can maintain control of the company while reducing the proportion ofhislher holding in 
the company by establishing a pyramid of holding companies. (See Barr, Gerson and Kantor 1995 
for an explanation of this system and its pros and cons.) The mines are thus, in effect, controlled by 
a small number of groups or individuals, and there may consequencially be an element of monopoly 
in the mining industry domestically. This however does not imply an ability to control world prices. 
Control over world prices would be a prerequisite for the utilisation of any monopoly power and 
the slowing of production this would imply. As indicated above, such control may be possible in 
the cases of some minerals in the short run. however, long run control is dubious as monopoly 
profits encourage exploration elsewhere. 
Even in the case of diamonds there is some doubt about the effect of concentration on extraction. 
There is no denying that DeBeers controls the world price of diamonds through its Central Selling 
Organisation. The CSO acts as a monopsonist as well a monopolist, and does not control 
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extraction from all mines. It is thus unclear whether there will be an incentive for individual mines 
to slow do\"m production to monopoly levels. 
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Appendix C 
Importance of South African reserves in a world context 
Mineral Reserves %West %World Rank* 
Manganese 
(metal) 
4.0 Gt 90 82 1 
Platinum Group 
Metals 
30.2 kt 85 78 1 
Chromium (ore) 2.4Gt 58 56 1 
Vanadium 
(metal) 
7.8 Mt 47 1 
Gold (metal) 20.0 kt 44 I 
Alumino-silicates 
(ore) 
51.6 Mt 37 1 
Diamonds 360.0 Mcts 27 24 2 
Zirconium 
(metal) 
6.9 Mt 16 4 2 
Uranium (metal) 3l7.0kt 13 N/A 30r4 
Fluorspar (CaF2) 32.0 Mt 30 11 3 
Titanium (metal) 31.1 Mt 12 11 4 
Coal 
(recoverable) 
58.4 Gt 20 10 4 
Nickel (metal) 11.4 Mt 12 10 6 
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South African Production in a world context 
SA Production as % of World 1989 Rank 
Manganese metal 68 1 
Alumino-silicates 47 I 
Vanadium 44 1 
Vermiculite 41 2 
Chrome ore 31 1 
Gold 30 I 
Ferrochromium 29 I 
Titanium minerals 26 2 
PGM 21 3 
IManganese ore 19 2 
Zirconium minerals 16 2 
Ferromanganese to 3 
Diamonds to 5 
Antimony 8 4 
Fluorspar 6 5 
Coal 5 6 
Silicon metal 5 7 
Asbestos 3 7 
Iron ore .... -' 8 
Ferrosilicon 2 8 
Phosphate rock 2 9 
Lead 2 12 
Copper 2 14 
Silver I 14 
Zinc I 16 
Uranium na 7 
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South African Exports in a world context 
SA Exports as % of World 1989 Rank 
!Vermiculite 92 I 
Vanadium 83 I 








Manganese ore 31 I 
Ferromanganese 28 I 
PGM 27 3 
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Role of Minerals in South African Exports 
Commodities Value (R million) % Contribution to Total Exports 
Gold 23236.3 29 
Diamonds 9480.6 11.9 
Metallic 6169.6 7.7 
Coal 5227.8 6.6 
Platinum 5188.8 6.5 









A numerical description of the effects of the gold mining tax fonnula (adapted from the Margot 
Commission of Inquiry 1987). 
The tax fonnula is: 
Y=A-AB/X (0) 
where Y is the tax rate as a percentage of profits, A 60 and B = 6 or 8 depending on the age of 
the mine (6 for pre-1966 mines and 8 for post-l 966 mines). X =the ratio (expressed as a 
percentage) of profits to revenue. 
If we call revenue R and costs (including capital expenditure) C, then profits will be (R - C) and 
X = 100(R - C)/R. (I) 
If we call the tax payment T then 
Y 100T/(R - C). (2) 
Substituting (1) and (2) into (0) gives the standard expression for profits retained after pa:vnlent of 
tax: 
R - C - T = (I - AlIOO)(R - C) + ABRll04 (3) 
TIlls expression shows that after paying tax, the mine retains (I - AI I 00) of its profit plus a 
fraction (ABIl04) of its gross revenue. This expression has been simplified by ignoring capital 
allowances, however, the results are essentially the same. 
From (0) it can be seen that the states share of profits will be zero when X =B. This indicates the 
maximum ratio of profit to revenue the mine can earn before becoming liable to pay tax. The 
constant A gives the upper bound on the State's share of profits if the mine has a very high profit 
rate, i.e. for A = 60, the state can tax at a maximum of 60 percent (before any surcharges). 
1 
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The standard expression makes quite clear the incentive a mine has to spend more than RIOO in 
order to mine ore worth exactly RIOO. The sliding scale makes it possible for the mine to save 
more on tax payments than it loses by mining in an inefficient way. 
A numerical example: 
Assume a mine \vith A == 60 and B 8 (i.e. a "480-formula" mine), the formula is then: 
Y == 60 - 480/X 
The standard expression then shows that the mine will retain 
(l - 601100){R - C) + 60 x 8 x RllO./ 
== O.4{R - C) + 0.048R (4) 
as profits. 
Assume the mine spends (100 + Z) in order to earn 100, in order to find the maximum size of Z 
which does not reduce retained income, substitute 100 for R and (100 + Z) for C in (4) and set 
equal to zero, so that the reduction in the first term is exactly offset by the increase in the second. 
The result is that 
Z = 4.8/0.4 
12 
i.e. the mine can spend RI12 to mine ore worth RIOO, without reducing its retained profits. The 
mine thus mines a lower average ore grade as it mines lower grade ore to reduce the pre-tax profits 
it makes on higher grade ore. This distortion of 12%, would be worsened by the imposition of any 
surcharge. In 1988, when the tax formula was imposed on top of the lease formula, and a 
surcharge of25% was levied on top of everything, the distortion was as high as 38% in the case of 
some "480-formula" mines. That is the mines could spend Rl38 in order to mine ore worth RlOO 
without reducing their retained (after tax) profits. 
The following table shows the profitability of working various grades of ore for a mine facing the 
"480-formula" tax, Column (5) shows the retained profit at various grades, column (4) shows what 
the fisc would get from or contribute towards the mining of various grades. Columns (1) to (3) are 
the cost, additional revenue, and profit or loss made from mining various grades respectively. The 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C R R-C Tax Retained 
100 130 30 11.76 18.24 
100 120 20 6.24 13.76 
100 110 10 0.72 9.28 
100 109 9 0.168 8.832 
100 108 8 -0.384 8.384 
100 105 5 -2.04 7.04 
100 100 0 -4.8 4.8 
100 95 -5 -7.56 2.56 
100 90 -10 -10.32 0.32 
100 85 -15 -13.08 -1.92 
100 80 -20 -15.84 -4.16 
The mine is thus encouraged to mine down to a grade of ore that is onJy between 85 and 90 percent 
of the grade that would be deemed payable in the absence of the tax (at an ore grade that yields 
R90 for every RIOO spent, the mine adds R0.32 to its profits by reducing its tax payments by 
RlO.32). 
To illustrate the point, if a mine with the cost and grade structure in the above example mined one 
unit ofore worth R130, it would make an after tax profit ofR18.24. If in addition it mined one unit 
of ore worth onJy R90 and thus reduced pre-tax profits to R20 it would increase after tax profits to 
R18.56 (up 32 cents), while the State's share from tax would fall from Rl1.76 to just RL44 (down 
by RI0.32). 
In 1988, with the lease payments and the surcharge, the lowest profitable grade to mine went down 
to 72.61 percent of the grade that would have been mined in absence of the fonnula tax system, i.e. 
any mine with a tax burden ofR27.39 could spend RIOO to mine an extra unit of ore worth R72.61 
without reducing their profits. The mines could thus waste R27.39, and reduce their tax burden by 
.J. 
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the same amount. Thus, the fisc would pay the mines R2739 (which it would have received if the 
ore had not been mined) to mine the ore. The fisc is thus R27.39 poorer, and the mines wasted 
R27.39 worth of resources, altogether a very expensive exercise. 
As can be seen from the above table. it is obvious that the same effect could be attained by keeping 
the ore grade constant and changing the cost side of the equation. This could be done by mining to 
deeper levels or mining less accessible ore bodies. Thus the effect of the tax is not just on grade 
selection, but on mining technique as well. The tax gives the mines an incentive to raise costs (in 
order to lower the profiHevenue ratio and thus the ta"X burden), which is obviously an inefficient 
and undesirable result from society's perspective (as valuable resources are wasted), but a 
perfectly rational one from the mine manager's profit maximising perspective. 
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Auuendix E 
An outline of a control theory approach to analvsing the influence of the fonnula tax on extraction and ore 
grade 
The following is an initial outline of a control theory approach to the influence of the fonnula tax on 
extraction and ore grade. The problem follows the pattern of the problems presented in chapter two of this 
paper, and assumes that the owner of a mine wishes to maximise the current value of after tax profits. 
Two possible scenarios are presented, one where there is no tax and one with the formula tax. The effects 
of the tax on the time path of average ore grade is then compared to the case of no ta\:. 
Let: 
G(t) ;: average grade ofore extracted in time t 
m(t) = the extraction rate. i.e. the alllount extracted in each time period t 
P(t) = the price for the refined metal received in time period t 
M(t) = the amount of ore remaining in the ground in time period t 
C(M(t» =the cost of extraction in time period t as a function of M, dC/dM <0 
T = terminal time 
1. In the case where no ta\: is levied, the maximisation problem facing the resource owner can be 
expressed as: 
T 
~ Ie' ot [GmP - C(M)]dt 
o 
s.t. III = - dMldt M(O) =Mo M(n:::O T free 
The current value Hamiltonian is then: 
H = [GmP - C(M)] + A(-m) 
The first order conditions are: 
aHlom =GP - A = 0 (1) 
oHloM = -IL = -CM (2) 
OHIo,,- = -m = dMldt 
..! 
77 
,,-(n;::: 0 M(n;:::O ,,-(nM(T) 0 
(1) & (2) => ,1,.= Gp+ PG= CJ;.,{ 
=> G = (CM - P G)/P or G P =CM - P G (3) 
I.e. the value of a change in average grade must equal the marginal cost of extraction less the change in 
value of the average grade mined due to the change in price. 
2. In the case of a mine facing the fonnula tax, the maximisation problem faced by the owner can be 
expressed as: 
M~ IT e 6t [ (1- A)(GmP - C(M)) + ABGmP]dt 
o 
s.t. m = - dMldt M(O) = Mo M(T);::: 0 T free 
where A and B are both constants greater than zero and less than one. 
The current value Hamiltonian is then: 
H = [(l-A)(GmP - C(M)) + ABGmPj + ,,-(-m) 
The first order conditions are: 
aHlam = (l-A)GP + ABGP - "- = 0 (4) 
aHlaM =-A = -(l-A)CM (5) 
aHlaA. = -m = dMldt 
,,-(T);::: 0 M(T) ;:::0 ,,-(T)M(T) = 0 
(4) & (5) => (l-A+AB)(G P + PG) =(l-A)CM 
-1 
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O<AB<A:=> (l-A+AB) > (I-A) 
(l-A+AB)/(l-A) > I 
let (l-A+AB)/(l-A) = Z 
then: 
Z( G P + P G) =CM 

:=> G = (CM - Z P G)/ZP (6) 

I.e. the tax augmented value of a change in average grade must equaJ the marginal cost of extraction less 
the ta'l: augmented change in value of average grade due to a change in price. 
Let G in the ta'l: case be referred to as G t 
373. Nowassuming PG and CM identical for both cases , Gt can be compared to G. 
Asswning P > 0 (as per Hotelling's assumption) 
. , 
Since Z > I :=> CM - Z P G < CM - P G 
and ZP>P 
G t < G 
Three cases are now possible: 
(i) PG<CM 
ZPG <CM => O<Gt<G 
I.e. the change in value of the average ore grade due to the change in price is less than the change in cost 




ZPG> CM => Gl<o< G 

37 This unfortunately introduces a static element to the dynamic problem, as such the results that follow 
are not technically acceptable. It does, however, allow the analysis to proceed in order to give some 
indication of the kind of effect the formula tax has 011 the average grade path as compared to the case 





I.e. the change in value of the average ore grade due to the change in price is less than the change in cost 
of extraction for the no ta"{ case, but greater than change in cost in the tax case. 
(iii) 	 PG>CM 
ZPG> CM 	 =:> G l < G <0 
I.e. the change in value ofthe average ore grade due to the change in price is greater than the change in 
cost of extraction for both cases. 
If P is assumed to be negative a fourth case is possible: 
(iv) 	 G >0 
G I > 0 and G I > G =:> 0< G < G t 
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